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David S. Cohen*

REGULATING REGULATORS:
T H E LEGAL ENVIRONMENT O F T H E STATE?

One purpose of law is to reduce the costs of accidents through their
reallocation by the state.' In this paper I analyse a particular and
problematical application of that idea - the impact of tort on accidents'
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Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia
This paper was written with the assistance of a research grant from the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Much of this paper was written while I
was a visiting professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of Toronto in
conjunction with the Connaught Program in Legal Theory. I have benefited from
discussions at the Law and Economic Workshop at the University of Toronto and from
comments by Professor Michael Trebilcock. I thank my research assistant, James
Penner who contributed much to this paper. In particular, the descriptions of current
bureaucratic practices and the treatment of damage claims against the federal government would not have been possible without his perseverance and conscientiousness.
To be precise, one function of tort law is to reduce the risk of accident losses. T o a large
extent my analysis will adopt an ex ante perspective on law. That is, I will analyse and
evaluate legal rules and processes in the light of their influence on the accidentavoidance behaviour of governments and bureaucrats that will take place after the rule
has been articulated.
The term 'accidents' is intended to exclude from analysis losses that are the product of
deliberate distributive judgments by representative institutions. 1 will assume for the
purposes of this paper that if legislative bodies redistribute wealth, it is inappropriate
forjudicial institutions to interfere with that decision. Thus, tort liability as I conceive it
is trumped by a demonstration that the loss was actually a disguised form of taxation.
See J. Quinn and M.J. Trebilcock 'Compensation, Transition Costs, and Regulatory
Change' (1982) 32 UTLJ I 17, at 173. AS Richard Epstein has said, there is 'a circular
and self-defeating quality upon insistence upon explicit compensation': 'Taxation,
Regulation and Confiscation' (1982) 2 0 Osgoode Hall LJ 433, at 436.
The difficulty, of course, is to distinguish between inadvertent accidents and taxation
decisions. One also has to determine how to respond when the government decises ex
post to characterize an inadvertent accident as a taxation decision -that is, should what
was an accident then be recognized as a non-accident? Perhaps one technique to
achieve the first objective is to presume that losses are inadvertent unless the state
demonstrates and acknowledges that it was engaged in wealth redistribution. One
advantage of this technique is that costs associated with discovery against the state
would be borne by the state rather than by victims. It is probably true that if costs were
allocated in this fashion they would be lower than if they were allocated to random
members of the public who happened to be victimized by state action. This
presumption appears to be operating in currentjudicial decisions. See City of Kamloqps
v. NieOen [ig84] 2 SCR I , 10 DLR (4th) 64 I ; Dorschell v. City of Cambridge (1980) I 17 DLR
(3d) 630 (Ont. CA).
My analysis will exclude an examination of contract claims against the state. The
contract liability of the state involves questions of bureaucratic financial accountability,
and must take into account the ability of the parties to allocate risks ex ante. Assuming
that the parties have negotiated a contract, it is possible to argue that liability rules
should reflect the private arrangements the parties reached or ought to have reached.
See R. Coase 'The Problem of Social Cost' ( 1 960) 3 J. of Law &? Econ. 1.
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generated by the activities of the state itself through public bureaucrats
and public bureaucracies.3 My object is to evaluate the role of liability rules
in reducing primary accident costs,4 and in particular to examine the
incentive effects of liability rules on the behaviour of the state as an
institution as well as on individual state actors.5
It is true that allocative efficiency may suggest the establishment of
loss-shifting mechanisms even if primary accident costs are unaffected by
liability rules. For example, it may be possible to justify compensation if a
shifting of losses from the individual to the community reduces the effect
of accidents that d o occur, and it may be that the distributive consequences of loss-shifting will increase aggregate social welfare. Yet in these
cases I am not justifying compensation on the ground that bureaucrats
will act differently in the future -with associated benefits related to a
reduction in the number and magnitude of accidents. Rather, I am
arguing for compensation on the ground that loss-spreading is allocatively efficient in its own right.6
In this paper I focus on the first issue - that is, the ability of tort law to
reduce primary costs, o r losses associated with the number and seriousness
of accidents.? In one sense I will be analysing the state as if it were a private
3 I should point out that this paper envisages the state as an institution that engages in
activities with allocative implications and is motivated to allocate its own resources
efficiently. There are no doubt innumerable other equally (and perhaps more)
virtuous social objectives in addition to efficiency. This focus on the state and efficiency
does not mean that efficiency is the only or the most important normative idea in
government. It is one; and it is one that is susceptible to an analysis that focuses on the
incentive effect of economic signals generated by compensation awards.
4 'Primary costs' refers to the subset of the losses associated with accidents which are a
product of the magnitude and severity of the losses and the probability of the
occurrence of the event that generates the loss. It is distinguishable from secondary
costs, which relate to the distribution of losses across members of society, and tertiary
costs, which relate to the administrative costs of loss-shifting institutions and instruments.
5 Two earlier efforts using economic analysis to investigate government liability are M.
Spitzer 'An Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in Tort' (1977) 50 SO.Cal. LR
515, and F. James 'Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers' (1955) 2 2
U.Chi. LR 610.
I will assume for the purposes of this paper that victim behaviour is independent of
the particular liability rules applied to the state. There is no doubt that if that
assumption is relaxed, optimal rules evaluated in terms of their ability to reduce
primary accident costs will be substantially different from the proposals offered here.
See L. Kaplow 'An Economic Analysis of Transition Rules' (1986) gg Ham. LR 51 I .
6 Guido Calabresi refers to this phenomenon as 'secondary cost avoidance.' See G.
Calabresi The Costs of Accidatc (New Haven: Yale University Press 1970). The benefits
associated with shifting losses from one person to many are derived in part from the
concept of diminishing marginal utility of money, in which the injury associated with
the loss of one's last dollar is considered to be marginally less than the injury associated
with the loss of the second last dollar, which is less than the injury associated with the
loss of the third last dollar, and so on.
7 Others have analyzed governmental liability using this functional approach. See, for
example, S.H. Nahmod 'Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability' (1974)
50 Ind. LJ 5, at 32-3.

Heinonline - - 40 U. Toronto L.J. 214 1990

REGULATING REGULATORS

2 15

firm in which losses suffered by private individuals and firms are
externalities.' Several years ago Mark Spitzer wrote a paper on this topic
in which he posited several models of state activity and analysed the
incentive effects of liability rules in each case.9 In my view Spitzer's
general conclusion - 'the rule which may be synthesized from all of the
models is that the government should be suable in tort"O - is supportable,
if at all, only under very constrained assumptions about state activity and
the operations of the review institution. If one looks only at the incentive
effects of tort law on public bureaucracies, one must conclude that the
optimal liability rule applicable to state action is a 'no liability' rule.
In evaluating tort law and state action it is important to recognize the
contexts in which state liability may arise. Tort claims under the federal
Crown Liability Act" have been brought in respect of economic losses
suffered during labour disputes,'" personal injuries in the case of
care-taking responsibilities,'3 economic losses in the case of alleged
political patronage,I4 and economic losses associated with inadequate
regulation of trust companies.15 Tort law as a regulatory tool is perhaps
best understood if it is considered in a limited set of bureaucratic activities.
One familiar example of the intersection of tort law and government
action is the losses associated with the delivery of specific kinds of public
goods, such as the injuries associated with the non-delivery of police
services. In order to clarify some of the ideas in this paper I will analyse
the liability of the government and individual state officials for losses with
reference to the enforcement of legislation by police officers.16 I have
chosen this example for several reasons. First, many of the limited
empirical data that have been collected on the impact of liability rules on
state action describes police behaviour, and a substantial portion of the
analytical and theoretical articles on government liability have dealt with
polide-associated injuries.'7 Second, ;significant number of the adminis8 This perspective is not common. See L. Kaplow 'An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions' (1986) gg H a m . LR 509, at 563.
g M. Spitzer 'An Economic Analysis of Sovereign Immunity in Tort' (1977) 50 SO.Cal. LR
515.
l o Ibid. 537
1 1 RSC 1970, C. C-38, s. 3
1 2 C a d i a n PacificAirLines v. The Queen rig771 1 FC 715, appeal dismisses [ig7g] 1 FC 39.
13 Kezar el al. v. The Queen et al. [ig77] 2 W W R 8 3
14 Nadeau v. The Queen [lg77] FC 54 1
15 Baird v. The Queen (1983) 148 DLR (3d) 1
16 At the same time, there is no reason to believe that my assessment of liability rules and
the state should be limited to the police, since most other government units share the
critical characteristics which suggest that state liability should not be modelled on ~ d e a s
derived from private tort law.
17 See Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. Survey ofPoliceMitconduct Litigation
1967-1971 (Evanston, Ill. ig74), cited in E.J. Littlejohn 'Civil Liability and the Police
Officer: T h e Need for New Deterrents to Police Misconduct' (1981) 58 U . Detroit J. of
Urban Law 365, at 381-2 n86 and accompanying text.
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trative and legislative reforms in the area of government liability have
'~
the police typically
involved the police and police i n s t i t u t i ~ n s . Third,
engage in activities that have a private analogue, such as automobiledriving, as well as in activities that have no private analogue, such as
arresting or protecting private citizens. Fourth, the police operate in
relatively complex bureaucratic institutions, and the impact of liability
rules is influenced by the institutional environment in which bureaucrats
operate. Fifth, the police institution is easily perceived to be independent,
at least to some degree, from the government. This independence may be
important and is often lost sight of when discussing the liability of
government departments and other sub-bureaus. Sixth, a substantial
number of police liability cases have been litigated,'g and one can draw on
written "iudicial reasons as well as case results for information on how the
courts as an institution are responding to claims for compensation.
In part I of this paper I consider the appropriate 'object' of liability
rules. The choices of liability 'objects' include the state (which can be liable
directly or vicariously), individual bureaucrats, and a range of subbureaus within the government, including Crown corporations and
departments. In the case of direct state liability, the liabilityrule is applied
to the government, which can respond to the liability risk in any way it
chooses.'" In the case of personal bureaucratic liability, the liability rule is
applied to the bureaucrat, who can respond in any way she chooses." In
18 The most significant legislative action in this context is section 25 of the Criminal Code,
~ s 1970,
c
C. c-34, which affords protection to police officers exercising powers under
the Code if they act on 'reasonable and probable grounds.'
19 The litigation against the police falls into a range of cases. On wrongful arrest and
detention, see Butt v. Saint and Loveless (1983) 38 Nfld. & P E ~ R15 (Nfld SCTD) ($500
damages awarded to plaintiff who was detained by police officer without being
arrested); Langv. Burch and CarOon (1981) 8 Sask. R. 96, affd sub nom. Lung v. Burch et
al. (1982) 140 DLR (3d) 325 ($5,000 damages awarded to plaintiff for wrongful arrest);
Rumilly v. Weatherhead (1975) 55 DLR (3d) 607 (BCSC) ($300 awarded to plaintiff where
police officers continued detention after having learned that plaintiff was not the
person they suspected him to be). On actions for assault and battery, see Sandison v.
Rybiah (1973) 39 DLR (3d) 366 (Ont. HC) ($3,500 awarded to plaintiff who was beaten
after demanding explanation for arrest of another person. On actions for misuse of
firearms, see Woodward v. Begbie (1962) 31 DLR (2d) 2 2 , 132 ccc 145 (Ont. HC) ($518.80
awarded to plaintiff who was shot without cause by police officer). On actions for illegal
search and seizure, see Win Gat v. Johmon ( I 908) q WLR 293 (Sask. CA) ($100 awarded to
plaintiff whose house was broken into by police).
2 0 Presumably, the responsechosen by the government would maximize its welfare within
constraints imposed by limited information and constitutional principles. If we are
concerned with maximizing aggregate social welfare, and if we think that the
government and social welfare do not necessarily coincide, then subsidiary liability
rules must be developed which constrain the responses of the state to liability risks and
losses.
2 1 Of course, it is possible to establish secondary liability rules that prevent certain
responses. At the same time, it would be difficult to monitor those secondary rules.
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the case of vicarious liability, the victim must demonstrate that a particular
bureaucrat committed a tort; once that threshold test is met, liability is
imposed on the government without any further requirement." If one
decides in favour of a system of liability rules, which I do not, then the
optimal liability regime will impose accident costs either on the state or on
the sub-units of the government, and not on individual bureaucrats.
In part 11I analyse government liability; it is assumed that the activities
and choices made by the relevant state actors are efficient. Under that
assumption it can be argued that losses need not be internalized. Tort law
is usually necessary to force private firms to take social costs into account.
If the state is currently taking into account all social costs, then it does not
appear to be necessary to use tort law to internalize private losses. T h e
idea underlying government immunity is that to some extent the state will
take into account the welfare of potential victims of state action.'3
Bureaucratic institutions operating according to this model will make
decisions that maximize social welfare, and will make those decisions
whether or not they are subject to liability in tort. If the government is
working perfectly, then, as is the case when markets are working
perfectly, tort law is unnecessary from the point of view of efficiency
analysis, and a 'no-liability' rule is optimal. In part 11 I also analyse
government liability in the case of two different kinds of inefficient state
action. In some cases the state and bureaucrats are motivated to act
efficiently, but for one or more reasons they fail to do so. In other cases,
the state and bureaucrats are motivated to act inefficiently. If one assumes
inefficient government decisions, then an argument in favour of shifting
the losses to the state can be made; but that argument holds only if one
assumes, first, that the loss-internalization regime is cost justified and,
second, that the state will respond to the loss-shifting in a particular
manner.
In part 111 I explore whether and in what circumstances loss-shifting is
cost-justified. I conclude that even if liability rules might appear to be an
appropriate loss-internalization tool we would not necessarily choose
liability rules based on models employed in the private sector. In assessing
the desirability of liability rules we should be concerned with their
marginal net benefits, which might be relatively small given the transaction and error costs of establishing and using court or non-court institutions and the existence of alternative loss-internalization instruments.
22

23

That is, vicarious state liability represents a strict liability regime once it is determined
that a bureaucrat committed a tort.
I explore the implications o f the opposite assumption - that public bureaucrats are
motivated to maximize private welfare -in part v. This assumption is widely discussed
in the public choice literature. See, for example, D.C. Mueller Public Choice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979) at 148-70.
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In part IV I assess the response of the state to liability rules, and argue
that it is highly unlikely that the state will respond to contingent liability
risks so as to reduce accident costs in the same fashion as private firms.
Thinking about the legal environment of the state necessarily involves an
inquiry into the impact of liability on state action. A critical assumption
behind recommendations to expand government liability is that governments react to liability rules like a private economic actor. In contrast, a
'no liability' rule is optimal when the government and bureaucratic
agencies do not react to economic incentives at all. That is, only if one
assumes that the state is constrained, like a private firm, by relatively
efficient markets in labour, products, and capital can one predict that, ex
ante, the state will react to liability risks by adopting efficient accidentreduction measures. In part IV I analyse government liability rules in the
light of the government institution's ability to pass those costs on to its
constituents through self-insurance, legislative loss-shifting, and similar
mechanisms. This aspect of government liability is peculiarly sensitive to
the particular level of government under study. T h e ability of governments to shift losses to their constituents depends on the level of political
competition they face, and on the particular taxing powers available to
them; we can assume that, as between the market and the tax system, the
state will use the latter to shift losses. Only if the effect of liability rules is
the establishment of efficient systems of internal administrative discipline, can they be justified on the basis of the evaluative criterion
described earlier.'4
In part v I explore several possible liability rules that might be
implemented in a subset of government activities. Even if one accepts that
only the net marginal benefits of liability rules count, some might argue
that there may be some general distinctions, which, while imperfect,
might be relatively easily applied, and which might generate optimal rules
in a limited subset of cases. For example, in the case of enterprise
organizations,'5 one might assume that the public enterprise will be
24 G.A.-~ermann
'Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability' (1977) 77 Col. LR

25

i 175, at 1202. In investigating these aspects of state liability, I draw on the limited
empirical data which attempt to describe the influence, if any, of current state liability
on state action in Canada and the United States, and reach some tentative conclusions
about the desirability of that regulatory impact. Several American studies suggest that
existing liability rules have had little influence on state action. These studies can be
contrasted with judicial references to the potential chilling effect of liability rules on
bureaucrats. In evaluating these data it is important to remember that the bureaucracy
is not a monolith, and that it may be impossible to extrapolate the preliminary findings
beyond the particular bureaucracy in which they were generated.
By this I mean institutions, controlled by government, usually organized onacorporate
model, which are engaged in delivering goods or services to the public using market
mechanisms. T h e use of these arrangements by the government to implement public
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attempting to maximize profits, and that it should operate subject to
liability rules analogous to those applicable to the private economic actors.
It may be difficult, however, to distinguish between government and
enterprise organizations. Even if the distinction can be made, we may
want to recognize the 'public' aspect of public enterprises, and if the firm
is acting as a social welfare maximizer, o u r model should not oblige it to
internalize social costs it already has taken into account. I also explore the
possibility of imposing liability on sub-units of government, but again
conclude that it is unlikely that such a liability regime will itself
significantly influence state action.
I

Bureaucratic or state liability?

Until recently, governments have not been directly liable in tort for losses
Since the Second World War, however,
associated with their a~tivities.'~
several national, state, and provincial governments have enacted statutes
that establish a mixed system of direct and vicarious liability. Under
current state-liability statutes, the federal state is directly liable to
D

policy grew rapidly during the post-war era. In recent years large numbers have been
'privatized,' usually through the distribution of the government's ownership interest in
equity markets. The degree of government control, the extent to which the government enterprise approximates corporate models, and the extent to and the ways in
which non-market considerations are permitted to influence the enterprise's decisions
vary considerably from institution to institution, and there is no 'bright line' to
distinguish private and public enterprises in this context. See M.J. Trebilcock and
J.R.S. Prichard 'Crown Corporations: The Calculus of Instrument Choice' in J.R.S.
Prichard (ed.) Crown Corporations in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths 1983).
26 T o be precise, the text might read as follows: 'The Crown in Right of Canada is not, in
the absence of statute, liable in tort.' For the purposes of this paper I will refer to the
Canadian 'government' or 'state' instead of the 'Crown in right of Canada.'
There are few historical descriptions of government liability in Canada. The
historical essays by Borchard and Holdsworth describe the English experience, which
for all intents and purposes is the same as ours. See W.I.C. Binnie 'Attitudes toward
State Liability in Tort: A Comparative Study' ( 1 964) 2 2 U.Tor. Fac. of Law Rev. 88; D.W.
Mundell 'Remedies against the Crown' in Remedies (Special Lectures of the Law Society
of Upper Canada, 1961) 149; B.L. Strayer 'Crown Immunity and Judicial Review' in
O.E. Lang (ed.) Contemporaly Proble~nrof Public Law in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press 1968) at 71; W. Mueller 'The Liability of the Ontario Government in
Tort' (1967) 25 U.Tor. Fac. of Law Rev. 3; W.S. Holdsworth 'The History of Remedies
against the Crown' (1922) 38 Law QR 141, at 280; and E. Borchard 'Government
Liability in Tort' (1948) 26 Can. Bar Rev. 399.
The immunity is often incorrectly attributed to the application of the maxim 'the
King can do no wrong.' See M. Aronson and H. Whitmore Public Torts and Contracts
(Sydney: Law Book Co. 1982) at 1. Other conclusory reasons include the alleged
absence ofjurisdiction over the sovereign offered by Locke J in CBC v. Attorney General
for Ontario [1959] SCR 188, at 204, and the Holmesian logic that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends, which
Holmes J expressed in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank 205 u s . 349, at 353 ( I 907).
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compensate a limited class of plaintiffs in cases of damage sustained while
on federal government property, o r as an employee of the federal
government. In all other cases, which comprise the vast majority of claims
and the greatest percentage of losses, government liability is vicarious.'7
In this latter category liability is imposid jointly and severally on the state
as an institution and on individual bureaucrats;" a prerequisite to state
liability is the commission of a tort by an individual civil servant.
The choice of this liability regime has an important impact on the ability
of the tort system to internalize social costs. TO the extent that accidents
are associated with institutional activities - that is, the planned, coordinated, and structured actions of numbers of individuals in the
context of achieving governmental objectives - the retention of a
vicarious liability model makes it impossible to shift losses to the state.'g
Many injuries apparently associated with a n individual bureaucrat result
from 'systemic problems' within the bureaucratic agency,s0 and imposing
liability at the lowest level of the organization may not be an effective
means of modifying institutional behaviour.3' similarly, if it is impossible
to determine the identity of a bureaucrat who committed a tort, accident
losses will be externalized.3' Moreover, to the extent that uncompensated
litigation costs are associated with the requirement that the plaintiff
27 For example, under section 3(1) of the federal Crown Liability Act, RSC 1970, C.c-38,
the federal government is liable directly for breahces of common law duties associated
with the ownership and occupation of property, for breaches of common law duties
associated with its status as an employer, and for statutory torts. It is vicariowly liable 'in
respect of a tort committed by a servant of the Crown' under the same section. Section
4(2) confirms that liability cannot be imposed unless an individual bureaucrat is found
to be personally responsible.
28 The federal government Claims Regulations, CRC I 978, c. 683, s. 14, specifically outline
the factors determining when and the extent to which the government can, in effect,
'claim contribution' - that is, be reimbursed by the public servant for the cost of her
torts.
29 This important limiting concept is also apparent in the law of nuisance, where the
courts have demanded that a loss be 'actionable at common law' before they will impose
liability on public institutions. See Caledonian Rwy v. Ogily (1856) 2 Macq. 229 (HL) and
The Queen v. Loiselle (1962) 35 DLR (2d) 274, at 276 (SCC).
30 It has been argued, for example, that 'abuses of prosecutorial authority are not
inherent in discretion; rather, they are contingent upon the context and manner in
which discretion is exercised.' See P.J. Utz 'Two Models of Prosecutorial Professionalism' in W.F. McDonald (ed.) TheProsecutor(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications 1979) 119.
The injuries suffered by private citizens are associated with the institution's structure
and operations. As Owen Fiss has said, the 'wrong is the structure itself,' and thus the
remedy must be directed at the structure to prevent the continuation of the injury. See
O.M. Fiss The Civil Rights Injunction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1978) at
11.
3 1 See 'Developments in the Law - Section I 983 and Federalism' (1977)go Ham. LR I 133,
at 1218-14.
32 See D.H. ~ a c 'Actions
k
against the Crown' in Suing the Government - A Conference Report
(Toronto: Insight Educational Services 1981) 26.
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demonstrate wersonal bureaucratic liability, fewer lawsuits will be undertaken,33 and i s a plaintiffs expected litigation costs increase the expected
value of the lawsuit must increase to.justify her investment.34
Judges have reacted to this difficulty byimposing vicarious liability on
the state for the torts of groups of bureaucrats35 and by imposing liability
when 'there is a reasonable case of action in tort against one [bureaucrat]'S6 but there is a considerable risk that an inability to pierce the 'black
box' of the bureaucratic state will substantially reduce the likelihood of
successful lawsuits. For example, it is difficult to conceive of a personal
liability regime dealing with the inadequate servicing of penal facilities,
with allegedly excessive security measures in municipal jails,37 with
systemic police brutality,38 and with injuries associated with racial
discrimination.39 Moreover, simply imposing vicarious liability does little
to solve this problem, since identification of the individual bureaucrat
who committed a tort is a costly and difficult (if not a n impossible) task.4"
The difficulties associated with using- personal
bureaucratic liability to
internalize institutional wrongs are magnified by common law rules that
preclude the imposition of vicarious liability on Crown corporations,
federal administrative agencies, and superior officers for the torts of
subordinate federal civil servants.4' An empirical study conducted in
33 Judges have suggested that in the absence of an explanation from the government of
the rationale for and the details of the decision-making process that gave rise to the
injury, they will presume that the government acted in an operational capacity and
thus, at least on this variable, is liable in negligence. See Kamloops v. Niehen, supra note
2.
34 The problem is exacerbated if the losses suffered by individual victims of state action
are relatively small, in which case, unless procedural modifications are employed to
permit the aggregation of claims, the individual plaintiff will not be motivated to sue.
35 See Nadeau v. The Queen, supra note 14.
36 See Stephens v. The Queen (1982) 26 CPC I (FCA) (action against the Crown in federal
court; court does not have jurisdiction against individual bureaucrat).
37 See Morgan v. Superintendent of Winnipeg Remand Centre el al. [1983] 3 W W R 542, at
557-8, appeal dismissed (1983) 29 Man. R. (ad) 55.
38 Build of Buffalo v. Sedifa 44 1 F. 2d 284 (2d Cir. 197I ) (action by citizens of Buffalo asking
for injunctive relief against police commissioner, the city, and individual police
officers).
39 See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 us. 362 (1976). In this case the Supreme Court denied
injunctive relief, apparently on the grounds that there was no pervasive pattern of
mistreatment. The trial court had issued an order requiring the defendants to revise
their existing citizen-complaint procedures. See COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. S u p p 1289
(1973).
40 Thus, institutional torts can be conceived of as injury-causing activities for which
responsibility cannot be allocated to one person. The term may also refer to losses in
situations in which individual actors are not identifiable within an organization.
41 Viscount Canterbury v. A t t o n q General ( 1 842) 1 Ph. 306 at 324; Quebec Liquor Commission
v. Moore [1g24] SCR 540, at 55 1-2. This difficulty applies even in the corporate context,
with the result that Crown corporations often will not be vicariously liable for the torts
of'their'employees. The courts have held that both thecorporation and the employees
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Connecticut in the late 1970s suggests that the same phenomenon will
result even in the absence of judicially created immunities. That study
examined the impact of 'constitutional tort damage claim' on the conduct
of police officers.4' Apparently, superior officers were not appreciably
affected by the legal actions brought against their subordinates. Of the
149 cases studied, superior officers were never found liable for the
constitutional violations of their line officers, were joined in only 82 suits,
and were defendants at trial in only g cases.43
Vicarious liability (and thus a requirement of personal bureaucratic
responsibility) has adverse effects on the ability of the tort system to
internalize losses for other reasons. Possibly the most important is the
exclusion of all losses that are not currently subject to regulation in the
private tort law system.44 It is fair to say that pure economic loss is only
imperfectly recognized in current private tort law doctrine.45 This partial
recognition of interests has two undesirable aspects. First, using a
vicarious liability regime will externalize losses to the extent that the tort
system does not recognize the interest. Second, bureaucratic behaviour, if
it is influenced at all, will systemically respond only to litigation risks in a
subset of cases. T h e resulting distortions in bureaucratic behaviour can
hardly be optimal.
Losses may also be externalized because injuries caused by public
institutions have no private analogue to which tort law has traditionally
been applied. Losses associated with paradigmatic state action including
policing, enforcement of statutes, delivering educational benefits, and
paroling prisoners will not be allocated to the state under any model that
simply transposes private tort law and applies it to individual bureaucr a t ~ . 4Finally,
~
the state is often engaged in delivering private and public

are Crown employees for whom the Crown can be responsible, but that neither is
responsible for the torts of the other. See Bainbridge v. Postmaster General [1go6] I KB
I 78, at 191; Roper v. Works and Buildings Commissioners [ ~ 151
g 1 KB 45; and McLean v.
Vancouver Harbour Commissioners [1g36] 3 WWR 657 (BCSC)..
An interesting exception to this doctrinal rule is the American decision in Carter v.
Estelle, 519 F. zd I 136 (5th Cir. 1975)~in which prison administrators were held
vicariously liable for the acts of prison employees.
42 See Project 'Suing the Police in Federal Court' (1979) 88 Yale LJ 781.
43 Ibid. 81 1-12
44 This point is developed more fully in D. Cohen and J.C. Smith 'Entitlement and the
Body Politic: Rethinking Negligence in Public Law' (1986)64 Can. Bar Rev. 1.
45 Ibid. Until Junior Books Ltd v. Veitchi Co Ltd [1983] I AC 520, [1g82] 3 All ER 2 0 1 (HL), it
was unlikely that a person whose only injury was financial could successfully persuade a
judge to shift the loss to another person.
46 The government is often engaged in activities that have no private counterpart. In
these cases losses may not be recognized simply because it is impossible to point to a tort
committed by the civil servant.
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goods through non-market instruments. The reluctance of judges to
recognize positive duties of beneficence between private individuals,
coupled with the requirement of personal bureaucratic responsibility,
means that losses associated with the non-receipt of government benefits
will be internalized only in a small percentage of cases.47
A third attribute of personal bureaucratic liability that may be
associated with loss-externalization is the focus of judicial review on
individual bureaucrats. It may be that the requirement that an individual
bureaucrat be identified in the lawsuit means that the decision-maker will
be forced to focus her attention on a specific person, perhaps giving rise to
a bias towards the defendant - especially in the case of institutional
plaintiffs. This elusive built-in bias is exacerbated by rules that preclude
the disclosure of insurance and indemnification arrangements which
might effectively shift the economic risks of liability to the state institution
with which the bureaucrat is associated. Even here, however, the bias in
favour of individual bureaucrats may reflect judicial notions of fairness an implicit understanding that the injury will only rarely be associated
with the activity of an individual bureaucrat, and that while the economic
risks of litigation may be shifted, the individual bureaucrat may face other
c0sts.4~
Individual bureaucratic liability may be suboptimal as a loss-internalization technique for other reasons. A particular bureaucrat will often be
responsible for losses that exceed her personal wealth. Leaving aside
issues of compensation, the bureaucrat will be indifferent to potential
liability for losses exceeding the value of her personal assets.49 In fact, she
may have an incentive to expend public resources on reducing the risk of
losses of a magnitude that might affect her personal wealth rather than on
reducing the risk of accidents in excess of that level.jOThus, to the extent
that we are concerned about the internalization of significant losses
47 I have recently argued that the limitation on recovery of losses associated with
non-receipt of government benefits should be modified. See Cohen and Smith, supra
note 44.
48 The emphasis on the individual defendant in cases of substantial public exposure may
cause the public to see the 'defendant official as a wrongdoer who has committed a
particularly offensive act ... rather than as a stand-in for his government employer.' C.
Whitman 'Constitutional Torts' (1980) 79 Mich.LR 5, at 57-8.
49 J.P. Murphy 'Is the Municipality Liable for Insufficiently Trained Police?' University of
Maine Bureau of Public Administration ( I 968) 2 1 ; S. Rose-Ackerman 'Reforming
Public Bureaucracy through Economic Incentives? no w s ~ v - i nLaw and Econotnic
Workshop Series, University of Toronto 1986, 25
50 That is, if she is given a choice between spending one dollar to reduce expected accident
costs from say, $~,ooo,oooto $goo,ooo, and spending the same dollar to reduce
expected accident costs from $20,000 to $ ~ o , o o oa, bureaucrat with a net worth of
$zoo,ooo probably will choose the latter, less efficient, alternative.
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associated with state action, personal bureaucratic liability will have little
impact on bureau behaviour.5'
Personal bureaucratic liability is also likely to generate less than optimal
responses because of the environment in which individual bureaucratic
decisions are made. Police officers who are faced with discretionary
choices while engaged in law enforcement activities in which their lives
and safety are threatened are hardly likely to engage in a cost-benefit
analysis that might generate efficient law enforcement behaviour. Their
uncertainty of the location of the liability line and the limited time in
which the decision can be made both suggest that personal police
decision-making behaviour ought not to be the object of 'tort regulation.'5' Moreover, the inability of an individual police officer to assess
factors outside of her immediate environment, and the lack of any
incentive to d o so given the individual focus of the liability rules will lead
to decisions that minimize personal risk and perhaps externalize losses
away from individual bureaucrats. Those decisions may bear no relation
to decisions that minimize risks across all bureaucratic activities.
Although the application of liability rules that demand personal
bureaucratic liability will result in the externalization of some losses, it
may also lead to the opposite result. T h e requirement that an individual
bureaucrat be found liable in tort may be associated with over-deterrence
- that is, with excessive accident-reduction responses by the bureaucracy.
If bureaucrats misperceive legal risks associated with regulatory action,
over-deterrence may take the form of less than optimal regulatory activity
and excessive loss-prevention measures.53 Alternatively, personal liability
rules may generate more than optimal regulation if the perceived risks
relate to regulatory inaction. O n the assumption thatjudges rarely impose
positive obligations on the state, one can confidently predict the former
response.54 T h e argument that some bureaucrats will respond in an
inappropriate fashion to threats of personal liability may be especially
51 One can also argue that personal liability rules encourage decentralization as a
response to potential personal liability risks. If the decentralization would not have
occurred otherwise, one can legitimately question its desirability.
52 See Priorv. McNab (1976) 78 DLR (3d) 3 19,at 327 (Ont. HC), in which these factors were
offered in support of not imposing liability on police officers who must 'frequently act
hurriedly and react to sudden emergencies.'
53 This argument was accepted by the Supreme Court of the United States in justifying
the granting of absolute immunity to President Richard Nixon from damage suits in
the case of constitutional violations. See respondents' brief in Nixon v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S.
73 1, 1 0 2 St. Ct. 2690 (1982),discussed in A.A. Orenstein 'Presidential Immunity from
Civil Liability' (1983) 68 Cornell LR 236, at 250.
54 1 am assuming that the bureaucrat cannot shift the loss to the state either ex ante or ex
post. T o the extent that insurance is available, the risk of under-regulation is reduced.
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relevant when the bureaucrat is likely to be cognizant of legal sanctions55
and when she is easily identifiable.S6
There are several reasons to predict that bureaucrats will act in
inefficient ways when faced with perceived risks of personal liability.
There is some evidence that as a class bureaucrats are substantially more
risk-adverse than the population as a whole.57 Assuming that they will
bear risks personally, they will react by refusing to implement their
regulatory responsibilities, delaying implementation, or engaging in
defensive litigation strategies - that is, building a record in anticipation of
lawsuits. In all cases we can anticipate inefficiencies. Further, underregulation will be produced as a result of the substantial asymmetrical
incentives associated with lawsuits as a regulatory device in the case of
public wrongs. Where bureaucratic remuneration is independent of the
social benefits the bureaucrats produce, officials who bear the risks of
~ ~ not be able to capture the
losses associated with their b e h a v i o ~ rwill
benefits.59 This will be so even if we hypothesize some kind of windfall
gains tax to internalize benefits at the governmental level.60Certainly one
can anticipate that bureaucrats will be rewarded through increased
remuneration, promotions, and the like when they demonstrate that they
are fulfilling their regulatory responsibilities; and to the extent that they
are, one can argue that they are personally capturing some of the social
benefits associated with their a ~ t i o n s .None
~'
the less, it is unlikely that the
55
- - The concern is most commonly voiced in the context of prosecutorial immunities. See
Gregoire v. Bid& et al. I 77 F . nd 579 (1949) and Owslq v. R. in Right ofOntario (1983) 34

-

CPC ~6 at I O I (Ont. HC)..
56 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, supra note 53, 2703 (S. Ct.)
57 P.H. Schuck Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs (New Haven: Yale
University Press 1983) at 57,70; D. Bellante and A.N. Link 'Are Public Sector Workers
More Risk Averse Than Private Sector Workers?' (198 I ) 34 Industrial &?Lab.Rel. Rev.
408
58 This phenomenon is independent of the standard of care established for official
liability. Michael Trebilcock and Jack Quinn made this point in 'Compensation,
Transition Costs, and Regulatory Change' (1982) 32 UTLJ I 18, at 131-2. The
incentive structures that bureaucrats face are likely to lead to decisions that disfavour
compensation.
59 As Richard Posner put it, 'There is thus an imbalance: zealous polic officers bear the
full social costs of their mistakes through the tort system but do not receive the full
social benefits of their successes through the compensation system.' See R.A. Posner
'Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases' (1982) 57 Wmh.
LR 635, at 640; R.A. Posner 'Rethinking the Fourth Amendment' [ig81] Sup. Ct. Rev.
49, at 65; J.L. Mashaw 'Civil Liability of Government Officers: Property Rights and
Official Accountability' (1978) 42 Law €3Contemp. Prob. 8, at 26-7.
60 See Kaplow, supra note 8, 570.
61 It seems unlikely that bureaucrats could receive remuneration in the form of shares or
options representing a proportion of tax revenues, or increases in gross national
product. None the less, if bureaucrats could be paid on a 'piece-work' basis, under
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anticipated gains in any way approximate the perceived risks of personal
liability.6'
T h e asymmetry is exacerbated by the doctrinal rules described earlier,
which make it difficult if not impbssible to sue bureaucrats when they
remain passive. Thus, when a bureaucrat fails to act she can anticipate
that the persons injured as a result of her passivity, even if they can
identify themselves or be identified, will not sue; and if they do, they
probably will not succeed.63 Conversely, victims of state action are easy to
identify, and are likely to attempt to obtain compensation when the losses
are highly focused.64 The problem is well recognized in cases of
regulatory action, where the victims are diffuse and unorganized and the
beneficiaries are highly focused. In the case of threatened litigation the
skewed incentives will .give
rise to inaction.
.#
Attempts to respond to the problem of skewed incentives can take
various forms, none of which is entirely satisfactory from the point of view
of accident-reduction analysis. First, it is common to enact 'tort privative
clauses' that provide that a particular bureaucrat is not personally
responsible for losses associated with her a c t i o n ~ .Moreover,
~j
judges have
which they would receive remuneration determined by the net social benefits they
produced, tort law would be unnecessary.
62 The logic of this argument might lead one to conclude that direct state liability is
optimal, since the state (in the sense of the individuals who are members of the relevant
community) will obtain the benefits associated with state action, and thus will npt have
their choices biased against action. The problen~with that argument is that the
community does not make the decisions giving rise to the injury, nor are the benefits of
state action allocated equally among all citizens.
63 Lawsuits that seek compensation for bureaucratic inaction are unlikely to succeed
because the liability of governments and bureaucrats is modelled on private liability. As
a general rule, judges have been reluctant to impose liability on individuals for failures
to assist others; and when this idea is transposed to the public sector, bureaucrats are
rewarded for inefficient passivity as compared with inefficient action. See Cohen and
Smith, supra note 44
64 See Butz v. Economou 438 U.S.478, 515 (1978).
65 In addition to the Criminal Code immunity, police are protected when they exercise
enforcement powers under provincial legislation in a number of provinces. In Ontario
the Public Authorities Protection Act, RSO 1980, c. 406, grants extensive immunity to a
range of public servants who commit torts in the course of carrying out their public
duties. See Colledge v. Niagara Regzonal Police Commission (1984) 1 OAC 23 (the act does
not apply to internal disciplinary proceedings under the Police Act); Berardinelli v.
Ontario Housing Corporation [1979] 1 SCR 275, (1979) go DLR (3d) 481 (the act applies
only to public and statutory responsibilities).
In Saskatchewan, police are afforded a 'good faith' immunity under the Police Act,
~ s 1978,
s
c. P- I 5, S. 19, and the Summary Offences Procedure Act, RSS 1978, c. s-63, s. 7.
These sections were applied in Carr v. Forbes el al. (1980) 7 Sask. R. 123 (Sask. QB),
Morrissette and Morrissette v. Salagubm and Hosaluk (1984)32 Sask. R. 25 (Sask. QB), and
Lang v. Bruch and CarLton (1982) 18 Sask. R. gg (Sask. CA).
There are innumerable statutes providing for bureaucratic immunities in particular
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established additional analogous common law i m m ~ n i t i e sIn
. ~one
~ recent
case, bureaucratic immunities were justified on the utilitarian argument
that the externalization of losses was necessary 'for the advancement of
the greater public good' in view of the potential impact of exposing
bureaucrats to the risk of personal liability.67 While these statutory and
judicial immunities are likely to be adequate in rebalancing the incentives
faced by some groups of bureaucrats, they have the secondary effect of
insulating the state from responsibility as well. A decision to immunize the
bureaucrat under current vicarious liability rules may preclude the
allocation of the loss to the state.68
Another response to potential personal liability risks is the enactment of
'legal defence' statutes, which provide that the state must furnish
individual bureaucrats with legal representation o r compensate them for
situations. See Wildlife Act, RSBC 1979,c. 433, s. 80(3),and Diversified Holdings Ltd v. R.
in Right of BC [1g83] 2 WWR 289 (BCCA). These statutes commonly insulate bureaucrats
from liability when they act in 'good faith.' See Trade Practice Act, RSBC 1979, c. 406, s.
16(1), and Liquor Control Act, RSA 1980, c. L-17, s. 77(4).
66 The immunities that are judicially created are enjoyed for the most part by state
officials engaged in judicial or quasi-judicial activities. The most notorious of these are
the absolute immunities enjoyed byjudges and Crown prosecutors. See Bosada v. Pinos
(1984) 44 OR (nd) 789, (1984) 5 ~ ~ ~ ( 4334
t h(Ont.
) HC), and Richmanv. McMurtty (1983)
147 DLR (3d) 748 (Ont. HC). The prosecutorial andjudicial immunities were recognized
soon after Confederation: see The Queen v. McLeod (1883) 8 SCR I , at 26. In Ontario
these judicial immunities are established under the Proceedings against the Crown Act,
RSO 1980, c. 393, SS. 2(2)(d) and 5(b). See also Owslqr v. R . in Right of Ontario (1983) 34
CPC 96, at I O I (Ont. HC).Compare Nelles v. The Queen in Right of Ontario (1985) 51 OR
(2d) 513, at 5 3 0 ~ 2 3
CCLT 291, at 312 (Ont. CA),rev'd in part by (1989) 60 DLR (4th) 609
(scc).
American courts have adopted similar immunities forjudicial officers, justifying the
externalization of losses on the ground that judges would be over-deterred by the
and Stump v. Sparkman 435 U.S.
threat of liability. See Pierson v. Ray 386 u.s. 547 (1967)~
349, at 355-6 (1978) In addition, American courts have extended these immunities to
senior officials within the executive branch of government. See Sparlingv. V i h 161 U.S.
483 (1896). and B a w v. Matteo 360 U.S.564 (1959). Recently, absolute immunity was
extended to the President of the United States, even in the case of constitutional
violations; see Niron v. Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2690 (1982).
67 Richman v. McMurtty (1983) 147 DLR (3d) 748, at 753 (Ont. HC). A similar utilitarian
justification was offered by Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle 177 F. od 579, at
581 (1949).
In Scheuer v. Rhodes 416 U.S. 232, at 240 (1g74), the American Supreme Court
granted 'good faith' immunity to state officers faced with constitutional 'tort' liability in
light of 'the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness toexecute
his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.'
68 This does not have to be the case, since it is possible to establish personal bureaucratic
immunity and couple it with direct state liability either on a respondeat superior basis or
on theories of enterprise liability. See R.A. Posner 'Rethinking the Fourth Amendment'
[1g8i] Sup. Ct. Law Rev. 49, at 67-8. See also Norton v. United States 581 F . zd 390 (4th
Cir. 1978).
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legal e ~ ~ e n s e s ,thus
~ g reducing marginally the risks associated with
liability rules. Alternatively, the government may enact insurance statutes
that require government agencies to carry insurance for particular
officers for liability incurred in the performance of their official
responsibilities. Finally, the government may enact indemnification
statutes that require agencies to pay damage awards ordered against an
individual bureaucrat. In both cases the effect is to make the government
the insurer of its employees' liability risks and thus to shift the regulatory
impact away from the individual. T h e federal government employees'
union apparently has not considered it necessary to obtain such provisions as a term of employment,7" although indemnification takes place as a
matter of practice. Given the inability of bureaucrats to diversify the risks
of personal liability, and in the light of the obvious fact that the risk of
legal liability to the 'owners' of the state is diversified across the entire
tax-paying population, one can predict substantial advantages to both
parties through risk-shifting arrangements as an aspect of the employment relationship.7'
A possible private solution to the skewed incentives associated with
personal liability is the creation of a private market in 'bureaucratic
liability' insurance. Such insurance markets have developed to a limited
degree in somejurisdictions, but not in Canada.7' Given the inexperience
of insurance companies with running governments, the costs of acquiring
information about the enterprise whose activities are associated with the
risks it is expected to insure, and the costs of monitoring the insured's
activities, the failure of a private insurance market to develop fully is not
surprising; and even if insurance markets could take into account the
uncertainties associated with public activities, the provision of the public
insurance programs described above settles the question.
Yet it is not at all certain that even these arrangements are sufficient to
69 The array of possible insurance, indemnification, and similar arrangements is limited
only by the imagination of contract drafters, and the creation of mutual expected
benefits associated with shifting risks from individuals to a larger community. The
discussion in the text is a brief synopsis of the American experience described in M.G.
Yudof 'Liability for Constitutional Torts and the Risk-Averse Public School Official'
(1976) 49 So. Cal. LR 1322,at 1383-8.
70 This arrangement appears to be typical of public institutions in the United States. See
Monell v. New Yorh City Department of Social Sewices 436 us. 658, at 713 (1978)~
and
'Suing the Police in Federal Court,' supra note 42, 785, 810 et seq.
71 R.H.Kraakman makes this point persuasively in the context of private firms, but it
seems to me that it is equally applicable to public bureaucracies. See 'Corporate Liability
Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls' (1984) 93 Yale LJ 857. at 864-7. What is
interesting about Kraakman's ideas is that they predict institutional liability only, unless
personal liability adds substantially to our regulatory objectives.
72 See Yudof, supra note 69, 1385.
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overcome the skewed incentives. First, there is the uncertaintv associated
with determining whether the particular activity associated with the loss
comes within the insurance coverage. Moreover, it is possible that some
risks may be ~ninsurable.~s
More important, the costs associated with a
lawsuit brought against an individual bureaucrat may include emotional
trauma, employment disruptions, and associated non-monetary losses;74
these wouldnot be covered by liability insurance, which indemnifies only
for awards to plaintiffs.
Insurance or alternative risk-shifting arrangements may be less than
optimal for other reasons. Vicarious liability or personal liability with
insurance in all cases will result in the inappropriate shifting of losses to
the state in the case of the 'rogue' bureaucrat, who, using the authority of
her office, deliberately inflicts injury on a particular firm or individual for
personal gain. Roncarelli v. Duplessis75 is perhaps the best known of these
cases, but-corruption is not an entirely foreign idea in public bureaucracies. If a state official is insulated from liability under private risk-shifting
arrangements even when she acted in her personal interest, we will be
faced with a substantial risk of externalization of losses.
For all these reasons, personal bureaucratic liability, whether or not it is
coupled with insurance,-doesnot appear to be a desirable starting-point in
designing optimal government liability rules.76 T h e optimal liability
regime, assuming that a liability regime is desirable at all, appears to be direct
73 See R.J. Weddle 'Damages under S. 1983: Theschool Context' (1971)46 Ind. LJ 52 1, at
535, and Peoria v. Undmunter's at Lloyd's London, Unicorp 290 F. Supp. 890 (1968). It is
against public policy, of course, to insure oneself against the consequences of a criminal
act. The courts have broadly interpreted insurance policies, and the scope of negligent
behaviour that can be insured against is wide. See Tinline v. White Cross Insurance
Association [1921] 3 K B 327 (insured guilty of manslaughter in driving of motor vehicle
held to be covered by policy); compare O'Hearn v. YorkshireInsurance Co. (192 I ) 51 OLR
130 (Ont. CA) (insured who killed a man while driving drunk not indemnified for the
criminal act). Under the Insurance Act, RSO 1980, c. 2 18, s. 95, a violation of criminal
law no longer automatically renders unenforceable a claim for indemnity. The burden
of proof is on the insurer to demonstrate that the acts were criminal, and the activity
must be characterized as immoral. See American Auto Insurance Co. v. Dickson [1g43] SCR
'43.
74 'Suing the Police in Federal Court' supra note 42,809-1 1; Yudof, supra note 69,1390.
75 [1g5g] SCR 121, 16 DLR (2d) 689. (Similar claims have been made in Gershman v.
Manitoba Producers' Marketing Board (1976) 69 DLR (3d) I 14 (Man. CA)). By the term
'rogue bureaucrat' I mean the bureaucrat who is motivated by personal greed and acts
in such a way that no public benefit is associated with her action.
76 It should be obvious by now that the arguments against personal bureacratic liability
apply with nearly the same force to 'private' bureaucrats employed by large corporations. While there is no fundamental difference between the two bureaucracies, there
may be differential effects relating to the particular regulatory responsibilities of public
bureaucrats, which should genereate positive obligations to benefit the public, and to
the likelihood that performance-linked wage rates could be instituted in the public
sector.
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state liability. Under this model of liability a person injured as a result of
state action77would simply claim and obtain compensation from the state,
leaving that institution to develop efficient responses in view of its
exposure to accident risks.
The abrogation of personal bureaucratic liability and its replacement
with state liability raises subsidiary issues that must be resolved in order to
predict its impact on government-generated accidents. In particular, we
must choose between state liability based on the doctrine of respondeat
superior in which personal bureaucratic liability remains a prerequisite to
liability but is coupled with personal immunity or a prohibition on a right
to employer indemnifi~ation,7~
and direct state liability in which it is
unnecessary to demonstrate a civil wrong committed by an individual
bureaucrat. Leaving aside the advantages of either system from a
compensation perspective, the direct state liability model appears, at first
glance, to reduce litigation costs and thus to increase the likelihood that
actions against the state will be cost-justified. T o the extent that
enforcement costs are reduced, resulting externalities are avoided.
Furthermore, direct state liability reduces concerns with the exposure of
state bureaucrats to the non-compensable risks of litigation,79 reduced the
distortions associated with pro-defendant bias, and enables the tort
system to deal with institutional wrongs.
But a direct liability regime is not necessarily an effective method to
regulate state accident-related activity. Its desirability depends on a'range
of subsidiary issues. First, we must consider what it means to review the
state: we will, it seems, be forced to determine which state actors will be
considered to personify the state for the purposes of liability rules: to what
extent is it possible to identify individuals, institutions, and activities
whose conduct we can say is state conduct for the purposes of liability
rules? Second, the decision to adopt a direct liability regime will rest, in
part, on our assumptions regarding the current efficiency of state
decision. Finally, the advantages of a direct liability regime will depend on
the response of the state to the liability rules. (These issues are discussed
later in this paper.)
The final point in any proposal to adopt direct liability regime is to
77 That idea must be qualified in two important ways. First, one still has to define 'state
action,' which would exclude a wide range of redistributive activities that would be
undercut by compensation mechanisms; taxes are the most obvious examples, but
redistribution is achieved through a wide range of instruments. Second, one has to
differentiate between state actors acting in their personal and official capacities.
78 This is the model utilized by Posner in 'Rethinking the Fourth Amendment' supra note
59.
79 An excellent discussion o f the direct liability model of state liability is contained in
Bermann, supra note 24, I 194-1 2 0 2 .
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consider whether it is appropriate to retain personal bureaucratic liability.
The discussion of the adverse effects of personal liability suggests that the
answer is no. Yet one might argue that if we adopt a system of enterprise
liability, we must retain personal bureaucratic liability unless the state
reacts to the liability rules in the same manner as a private firm. That is, if
the state is not responding to liability rules, but is simply shifting them to
the tax-paying public, then personal bureaucratic liability is the only
effective regulatory tool we have. If the legal system cannot charge a price
high enough to deter the state's injury-causing activity, there is at least an
argument in favour of retaining personal liability.'"
As I suggested earlier, a further problem with enterprise liability is the
inappropriate shifting of losses to the state in the case of rogue
bureaucrats." If we believe that these types of injuries are engaged in by a
small number of bureaucrats who are not identifiable ex ante at a
reasonable cost, and whose activities in this context are not easily
monitored, personal bureaucratic liability with risk-shifting prohibited by
law appears to be the optimal regime." However, the argument that we
ought to retain personal liability in the case of bureaucrats who are
motivated by personal gain is meaningful only if we impose personal
liability coupled with subsidiary rules that prohibit loss-shifting to the
state. For the reasons set out earlier that is unlikely, and in any case would
generate substantial costs.'3
11

The efficiency of state action

THE EFFICIENT STATE

Using tort law to generate economic signals and thus to provide incentives
to the state to internalize losses suffered by private firms individuals
necessarily involves an analysis of the efficiency of the bureaucratic
decision associated with the loss. The economic rationale for loss
internalization to private firms is that the production function of private
firms will reflect only private costs. Thus, tort law is necessary to force the
80 The point is made by Kraakman, supra note 7 1,876, who refers to this idea as 'sanction
insufficiency.' He recognizes that if sanction insufficiency is the rationale for personal
bureaucratic liability, then risk-shifting must be prohibited.
81 See K. Kernaghan 'The Ethical Conduct of Public Servants' in K.M. Gibbons and D.C.
Rowat (eds) Political Cormption in C a d (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 1976) at
158, and A.A. Rogow and H.D. Laswell 'The Definition of Corruption' in A.J.
Heidenheimer (ed.) Political Cormption (New York: Holt Rinehart Winston 1970)at 54.
8 2 I admit that ex ante risk-shifting through contract wage modifications and similar
means would be difficult to monitor.
83 These costs would include the error costs in false positives, and the adverse incentive
affects that risk would present to bureaucrats.
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private firm to take into account social costs; if it does, its production
decisions will be optimal. If one makes the heroic assumption that the
state is currently taking into account all social costs, then it does not
appear to be necessary to use tort law to internalize private 10sses.~4One
idea underlying government immunity is that, to some extent, the state
will take into account the welfare of ~ o t e n t i a victims
l
of state action and
that, when it does, judges cannot effectively review those decisions.'5
Bureaucrats and bureaucratic institutions that operate according to this
model will make decisions that maximize social welfare, and will make
those decisions whether or not they are subject to tort liability.86 If the
government is working 'perfectly,' then, as when markets are working
perfectly, tort law is unnecessary from the point of view of efficiency
analysis, and a 'no liability' rule is optimal.
However, a n assumption that government is motivated to achieve social
allocative efficiency does not necessarily mean that we should never
impose liability for losses associated with state action. Rather, it suggests
that we ought to engage in a review process that investigates whether a
particular bureaucratic decision, set of decisions, o r institutional structure
accurately identifies a socially optimal choice and then implements the
choice in an efficient manner. 1f we find that the government, though
properly motivated, did not in fact achieve a potentially Pareto-optimal
outcome, we ought to impose liability.87 This should be so even if the
outcome was potentially Pareto-superior. In all cases, except for the
Pareto-optimal decision, liability rules will have the effect of ensuring that
the government takes into account all the costs associated with decisions
that do not maximize social welfare.88
84 In fact, if we were to d o so, without more, we would run the risk of 'double-costing' the
losses, with an associated under-production of the regulatory goods.
85 See W.F. Baxter 'Enterprise Liability, Public and Private' (1978) 42 Law €9 C o n t m p .
Prob. 45, at 50.
86 See Spitzer, supra note 5, 525-6.
87 It should be obvious that my analysis focuses only on non-redistributive decisions of the
state. It is not that I deny either the reality or desirability of redistribution, but rather
that I am assessing the allocative and not the distributive implications of liability rules.
88 There are several reasons which suggest that we ought to impose liability unless the
decision was Pareto-optimal. First, as long as the court is examining government action
for efficiency, there seems no reason that Pareto-superiority should be the test, since
Pareto-optimality maximizes rather than simply improves welfare. If Pareto-optimal
choice can be determined in the particular case, the government should be induced to
act in that fashion.
Second, using a standard of Pareto-superiority could have devastating effects on
equality and democracy. Pareto-superiority is value-blind in that as long as no person is
worse off, it is irrelevant who is made better off. A standard of Pareto-superiority could
allow for large variation in the relative wealth of groups, and exacerbate rather than
mitigate distributional consequences.
Third, a false misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction may arise here. The standard of
Pareto-superiority might be taken to imply that the government should be liable to
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THE INEFFICIENT STATE

The inefficient state can be visualized in two ways. In the first (case I ) ,
state institutions and bureaucrats are motivated to act efficiently but for
one or more reasons fail to do so. In the other (case a ) , state institutions
and bureaucrats are motivated to act inefficiently. T h e responses one
develops to these two forms of inefficiency are significantly different.89
One accepted rationale for government action holds that case 1
inefficiency may be relatively common - that is, we assume that
government failure represented by inefficient choices may occur even
when bureaucrats are motivated to maximize aggregate social welfare.
The problem that generates this type of government inefficiency is
related to an inability to identify and quantify the demand for goods that
exhibit 'shared indivisability.'gO The government often does not have
enough information about who will benefit or be injured as a result of
state action, and similarly does not have information about the value those
people place on the good or bad. As Mancur Olsen suggests, we do not
have the analytical or experimental techniques to identify the production
function of the public good, its optimal quantity, the value the public
places on it, and the possible substitutes that would be offered by
alternative suppliers (governments).gl T h e courts, and perhaps other
institutions, since they must live with the same paucity-of-information
characteristics of public goods, seem unlikely to be capable of more
accurate decisions that would have to be made in order to impose liability
in such cases.9'

89
go

gi
92

those it has made worse off (misfeasance)but should not be liable if it has simply failed
(that is, if it is simply guilty of nonfeasance) to maximize benefits to all groups, which
would be the Pareto-optimal decision. This is a false distinction, in that if both
Pareto-optimal and various Pareto-superior schemes can be deduced, the government
should choose the Pareto-optimal. T o prefer a Pareto-superior scheme over a
Pareto-optimal one is as much a positive choice act as any other.
Efficient state action is represented by choices and actions that maximize the aggregate
social welfare, while all other choices - whether they maximize bureaucratic, political,
or any other sub-category of welfare - are inefficient.
These goods are those which, like national defence, transportation infrastructures, and
information about government programs, can be distributed on an individual basis in
quantities an individual can purchase and enjoy privately. When markets and prices do
not operate efficiently, it is difficult to identify and value public demand for the good.
M. Olsen 'Official Liability and Its Less Legalistic Alternatives' (1978) 42 Law 6'
Contemp. Prob. 67, at 73-5
It is also true that such a review process would raise profound questions about
democratic government. An implicit assumption in such a proposal is that the political
will equals a desire that the government promote its definition of the public good. A
different assumption is that the political will equals a desire that the government
promote what the 'public' believes is the public good. If the second assumption is true,
then a review institution would have to assess not only efficiency considerations but also
the public's satisfaction with having its policy preferences implemented even if the
public later regrets the choice. Perhaps one value of the state is the learning process
engendered by its continual mistakes.
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A second basis for assuming that even social welfare-maximizing
bureaucrats may choose inefficiently is that bureaucrats may fail to take
into account non-budgetary costs, or perhaps may discount non-budgetary
costs more than they ought to. This phenomenon, referred to as 'fiscal
illusion;' has been used to justify the adoption of liability rules that will
transform social costs into budgetary costs in the case of expropriation
and other state activities involving deliberate regulatory and distributive
choices.93 Theories of public administration that treat bureaucracies as
rational market participants suggest that planners will interpret data in
such a manner as to maximize the probability that their departmental
objectives will be achieved.94 More important, the socio-economic impact
analysis currently employed in the federal bureaucracy does not include
contingent risks of legal liability associated with state action as a regulatory
risk.95 Moreover, bureaucracies may take into account and respond to a
subset of costs imposed o n highly organized groups of victims as well as to
highly focused costs.@ Given the random impact of tort losses, the costs of
litigation, and the omission of contingent liability risks from social
cost-benefit analysis, fiscal illusion may be a common source of government failure. If that is true, then, at least in theory, liability rules coupled
with internal administrative processes that respond to liability risks may
be an effective signalling device where losses are associated with inefficient state actions of this sort.97
Several writers who have developed models of efficient compensation
rules have assumed that state action is efficient, or at least that bureaucrats
are motivated to act efficiently.g8 There is considerable evidence, however, to support a different assumption - that 'deliberate' government
failure is as common as its more familiar private market economic
counterpart.99 It is frequently argued that elected politicians, government
93 See Kaplow, supra note 5, 567, and L. Blume and D.L. Rubinfeld 'Compensation for
Takings: An Economic Analysis' (1984) 72 Col. L R 569, at 580.
94 See J. Hirshleifer 'Comment on Peltzman' (1976) 19J. of Law L9 Econ. 241.
95 See Treasury Board of Canada Administrative Policy Manual Chapter 490 (Hull, PQ:
Canadian Government Publishing Centre Dec. 1979) Appendix E (evaluation methodologies), and G.B. Doern Rationalizing the Regulatory Decision-Making Process: The
Prospects for Reform Working Paper no. 2, Economic Council of Canada, Regulation
Reference (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada 1979) at 84-93.
96 As Blume and Rubinfeld point out, the presence of fiscal illusion is likely to be
associated with certain types of state action. T o the extent that the expected losses of a
project are concentrated on an influential group of potential voters, we can expect less
fiscal illusion (in terms of discounted costs) than in cases of highly dispersed losses:
supra note 93, 622.
97 As I point out in part v, however, more accurate and less costly signalling devices are
available.
98 See, for example, Blume and Rubinfeld, supra note 93,580.
gg This is the point that is frequently overlooked in Ronald Coase's now famous article on
the ability of private market arrangements to internalize social costs: supra note 2,
17-18,27-8.
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bureaucrats, and bureaucracies are 'non-maximizing,' and are motivated
instead by self-interest - including a n interest in enhancing their personal
wealth, professional stature and prestige, departmental size, power and
budgets, and managerial discretion. lo" There is a great deal of evidence to
suggest that bureaucratic decisions are influenced by personal motives of
departmental aggrandizement, especially in cases where the department
has substantial independence from superior bureaucracies.'"' If we
assume that government, a particular government agency, a particular
group of bureaucrats, o r a n individual bureaucrat is motivated to benefit
herself through decisions that increase her personal welfare, and that her
personal welfare is independent of the welfare of potential victims of her activities,
then, in theory, liability rules ought to be imposed.'"'
Another set of arguments suggests that bureaucracies, like legislative
institutions, are subject to majoritarian coercion and that this risk
'undermines any assumption that outcomes are necessarily welfaremaximizing.""3 Thus, there is no reason to take as a starting-point the
assertion that governments, like private economic actors, 'attempt to
minimize overall costs.""4 I find it difficult to accept that majoritarian
influence is a single explanation for bureaucratic action; it may be that
pluralist democrats would rephrase the problem as the non-social
welfare-maximizing functions of coalitions of minorities.1°5 Whatever the
details might be, in the context of tort claims one might posit that the
majority of individuals who are not tort victims will exercise their abilities
to influence the bureaucracy to maximize their private welfare at the
expense of those who suffer losses as a result of state action.'06 If that
loo See W.A. Niskanen Jr Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine 197I )
at 48, and J.-L. Migue and G. Belanger 'Towards a General Theory of Managerial
Discretion' (1974) 17 Pub. Choice 27.
101 See M. Olson TheLogic of CollectiveAction (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1965),
and A. Downs Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown 1967).
1 0 2 The same arguments apply in cases of government action that is motivated by a
bureaucratic interest in maximizing the welfare of private interests. The only
difference between the two is that in the latter the private welfare-maximizing agenda
may have been approved by the electorate in some general sense, and thus is not so
easily viewed with moral opprobrium. However, the critical variable - that government
decisions will fail to take into account social costs - is present in both.
103 Quinn and Trebilcock, supra note 2, 173; M.J. Trebilcock, D. Hartle, J.R.S. Prichard,
and D.N. Dewees 'The Choice of Governing Instrument: Some Applications' Economic
Council of Canada, Technical Report No. 12 (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada
198I) at Chap. I.
104 Spitzer, supra note 5,515
105 See R.A. Dahl Who G o v m (New Haven: Yale University Press 1961); R.A. Dahl, A
Preface to Economic Democracy (Berkeley: University of California Press 1985) at 46.
106 One might argue against this description of bureaucratic action, however. For
example, if tort accidents are distributed randomly among the population, the majority
will reflect the interests of potential tort victims, and thus, ex ante, will attempt to
influence the bureaucracy to minimize their expected accident costs.
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assumption is true, then liability rules should be employed in those cases
to shift losses to the government.1°7
We might also posit the existence of a set of bureaucrats who are
characterized by abusive motive^.'"^ In cases wherejudges have identified
bureaucratic decisions motivated by private gain to inflict personal or
economic injury on private citizens, they have imposed personal liability
on the bureaucrat for the tort of intimidation or abuse of office.lOg
Similarly, legislative provisions affording tort immunity to bureaucrats
commonly do not apply to actions taken in 'bad faith."'" These bureaucrats or bureaucracies, if they exist, ought to be subject to liability rules
that force them to take into account the losses associated with their
malevolent acts. l 1
This suggestion is subject to three caveats. First, it assumes that we can
distinguish between malevolent bureaucrats and others at a cost that is less
than the aggregate benefit associated with the loss internalization.
Second, in so far as we permit insurance against merely inefficient
bureaucratic actions, we must be able to deny insurance to bureaucrats in
respect of malevolent decisions. This will generate administrative costs
either ex ante or ex post, and we will have to pay for 'false positives'
represented by the residual risks faced by individual bureaucrats who
may be incorrectly labelled malevolent. Finally, if we do shift this loss to
the state as an institution, the benefits associated with that loss-shifting
must be closely evaluated. Rogue bureaucrats are difficult to identify ex
ante, and it is difficult to think of institutional responses that will
effectively reduce the risks to the public associated with their actions.
If one assumes inefficient state action in both case 1 and case 2 , it can be
argued that liability rules are an appropriate regulatory tool. None the
less, even under that assumption we would not necessarily choose to
design liability rules based on models employed in the private sector. In
assessing the desirability of liability rules we are concerned with their net
marginal benefits, and we must take account of the response of the
government to potential and actual liability risks, given that the government is not constrained by competitive capital or product markets.
107 This argument is subject to the analysis in part 4.
108 This is Spitzer's 'malevolent entity' supra note 5, 534-6.
109 See Rontarelli v. Duphssis, supra note 75, 143 (SCR);Takaro Properties Ltd v. Rowling
[1g76] 2 NZLR 657, at 662-4 (sc); Trobridge v. Hardy (1955) 94 CLR 147 (HC); and
Gershman v. Manitoba Vegetable Producers' Marketing Board supra note 75. It should be
noted that in Gershman the board rather than the individual bureaucrat was identified
as the malevolent entity.
I I O See, for example, Trade Practice Act, RSBC 1979, c. 406, s. 16(1); The Summary
Offences Procedure Act, ~ s 1978,
s
c. s-63, s. 7; and Liquor Control Act, RSA 1980, C.
L-'77 S. 77(4).
1 i 1 It is implicit in this analysis that I do not view the welfare gains to the rogue bureaucrat
as contributing to the aggregate welfare of society.
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The net margznal benefits of liability rules

Simply to say that government failure may be an explanation for
non-optimal (inefficient) decisions does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that we should review state action by using liability rules. It is
obvious that the only relevant benefits of liability rules are those net
marginal benefits that would be generated in addition to the lossinternalization associated with existing or alternative legal, regulatory,
and political instruments. That is, in assessing the desirability of imposing
liability rules on government, we must be cognizant of the costs associated
with the review mechanism, and of alternative regulatory instruments
whose actual or potential existence reduces the benefits associated with
implementing a government liability regime.
THE COSTS OF LIABILITY RULES

Even a cursory analysis of the review process associated with liability rules
reveals how complex and intractable it will be.'" I argued earlier that if
one is concerned with the internalization of social costs, liability rules are
appropriate only in cases of inefficient state action.113 The evidence we
have so far suggests that courts are aware of their limited institutional
competence to determine whether state actions are allocatively efficient.
The review would necessarily involve either replacing the politicalbureaucratic definition of the social welfare function, or evaluating
whether the bureaucracy achieved the outcome that definition would
have called for. In theory, direct state liability involves the review of
legislative and senior executive decisions by the courts (assuming that
curial institutions are retained in the review process). Not surprisingly,
judges have traditionally denied their authority to review the legislative
and senior executive institutions of the state,' '4 and the federal legislation
For example,-there has been considerable debate in the United States about the
appropriate role of the courts in evaluating cost-benefit analyses carried out by
administrative agencies. Judge David Bazelon suggests that the courts defer to
administrative expertise in reviewing agency cost-benefit analyses. See D. Bazelon
'Coping with Technology through the Legal Process,' cited in M.S. Baram 'Cost-Benefit
Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulatory
Decision Making' (1980) 8 Ecology L 4 4 7 3 , at 476. Compare H. Leventhal 'Environmental Decision-Making and the Role of the Courts' (1974) 1 2 2 U.Pa. LR 509, at 555.
I I 3 'Inefficient state action' refers to the activities of public bureaucrats that fail advertently
or inadvertently, to take into account their full social costs. This definition ignores the
redistributive role of most modern governments.
114 In the case of provincial and federal governments the issue has arisen in the review of
Crown prerogatives, and in attempts by victims of state action to argue that the cabinet
or particular ministers are Crown servants for the purposes of vicarious liability under
the relevant Crown liability legislation. These cases are not precisely on point, since in
the first executive action is reviewed, while in the second individual conduct is reviewed
and the imposition of vicarious liability on the state is urged. None the less, they are
112
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providing for tort liability in limited circumstances specifically excludes
liability for losses associated with the exercise of executive prerogatives. ' ' 5
Even if we could restrain the review institution from applying its own
definition of the social welfare-maximizing choices, it would still have to
determine the potential outcome of the bureaucratic welfare-maximizing
choice, compare it with the actual outcome (keeping all other variables
constant), and award damages representing the difference. Leaving aside
the administrative costs of identifying the 'victims' and distributing the
damage award, the determination of the two critical elements of the
equation - the outcome of the potentially Pareto-optimal choice, and the
outcome of the choice that was made - would generate enormous costs,
and would be characterized by substantial error costs in the current or any
imaginable review process.
T h e review process would not be significantly simplified, nor would its
accuracy be improved, if we were to relax the requirement of potential
Pareto-optimality and simply demand that governments motivated to act
efficiently pay damages when their decisions were not potentially
Pareto-superior. One might assume, for the sake of argument, that
governments motivated to act efficiently should act only after engaging in
a social cost-benefit analysis of the proposed choice, and that action is
taken only when the expected benefits of the action exceed its expected
c o ~ t s . ' 'If~ a person were less well off as a result of government action
close approximations of the review process we could expect if a direct liability regime
were established in these jurisdictions.
In the case of Crown prerogatives, the courts have refused to engage in substantive
review except on constitutional grounds. See S.A. De Smith Constitutional and
Administrative Law 4th ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin 198I ) at 137, and Attorney General
v. Nissan [1g70] AC 179.
In the case of ministers, the courts have said that ministers are not officers or servants
of the Crown. See McArthur v. R. [1g34-4] EX. CR 77, Belleau v. Minitter of National
Health and Welfare [1g48] Ex. CR 288, [1g48] 2 DLR 632, and Mavorv. TheKing (1919)19
EX.CR 304, 51 DLR 145.
I 15 See Crown Liability Act, RSC 1970, C. c-38, s. 3(6) I do not know if there is an easy
answer to the problem, but it does not seem possible to design an 'efficiency review
institution,' keeping in mind that allocative efficiency will incorporate distributive
choices. What might be possible is the application of enterprise liability to the state by a
non-judicial review institution, which will overcome the concerns about separation of
powers and institutional competence that generate judicial reticence when judges are
asked to review the decisions of cabinet and other senior bureaucracies. For reasons I
give later, I do not believe that even this proposal is justified.
116 While many would argue that the regulatory state ought to be governed by that
directive, it is both naive and optimistic to think that government policy is a product of
that exercise. None the less, in December 1979 the federal Treasury Board announced
a new policy governing all major new regulations or amendments of existing
regulations relating to health, safety, or fairness. Under chapter 490 of the Adminirtrative Policy Manual, all such regulations must be subjected to a socio-economic impact
analysis. The risk or cost aspect of the analysis represents an attempt to ascertain the
resources used in producing government benefits. The government department is
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taken after the impact analysis, it would be possible, in theory, to review
the analysis to determine whether it was carried out correctly. If the
reviewing institution determined that the state action should not have
been carried out in view of its assessment of the expected costs and
benefits of the choice that was made, compensation would be paid to the
victim. The difficulty with this model of tort law is that the review of the
social cost-benefit analyses carried out by the government is dramatically
different from the review of analogous decisions in the private sector.117
For example, many current models of social cost-benefit analysis
expressly mandate an assessment of the impact of a proposed regulation
on such variable as income distribution and regional balance, technological progress, market structure and competition, balance of payments,
international competitiveness, energy consumption, and inflation.''* T o
the extent that these factors are integrated into the decision-making
process, it is impossible to review them unless we are willing to accept the
reviewing institution as a super-government. Further, it is often necessary
to value human lives and suffering, and the distributional consequences
of state action, in determining the desirability of government activity. T h e
arguments about the appropriate figures to use in such cases, and indeed
the appropriate methodology to be used, do not seem to me to be capable
of resolution in a review forum. Moreover, the costs associated with
redoing the social cost-benefit analysis using non-experts would be
likely to be aware of its accounting budget, involving direct government expenditures
on administration, implementation, and policing. The assessment of government
action must involve a determination of the economic budget associated with a particular
policy, which will encompass all private and public costs. See A. Breton and R. Wintrobe
The Logic of Bureaucratic Conduct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982) 20-2.
117 I should point out that implicit in this argument is an assumption that the use of a
common law tort negligence standard to review government liability is inappropriate.
It is obvious that efficiency has a larger scope that negligence, which, as conventionally
defined, does not look to all the factors that collectively determine efficiency.
A second point implicit in my argument is whether the government should be made
to adhere to a negligence standard, or to an economic efficiency standard if those two
ideas are not coincident. For example, should the government be liable if it ignores
accepted economic expertise in reaching its decision - that is, when it chooses to ignore
the easily predictable effects of an admittedly political decision? Or should it be liable
only for damages caused through the negligent administration of a policy? T h e
electorate itself may be said to be acting negligently with regard to economic
information. Should the government be allowed to act inefficiently, and knowingly so,
when possessed of the broad support of the electorate? Here I think the answer must be
yes. If not, democracy would be reduced to the rubber-stamping of policies endorsed
by the economically reasonable man. We must recognize the importance of separating
policy decisions (and the inefficiencies they impose on administrative decision-making)
from inefficient administrative decisions for which the state should be held liable when
the decisions are made independent of a policy decision.
118 See Treasury Board Canada, Administrative Policy Manual, supra note 95, chapter 490,
at section 3.1.2 and Appendix E at 14-18. See also F. Thompson and L.R. Jones
R e p l a t o y Policy and Practices (New York: Praeger 1982) 152-74.
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substantial. Even identifying the resources expended in the private sector
in response to the public activity, and valuing those resources (a necessary
element in a socio-economic impact analysis) would generate significant
COS~S."~
T h e review process, even when it is applied to less formal instances of
government decision-making, is no simpler to design and implement. For
instance, one might imagine a decision of the police to dispense with
special protection for a young woman who notifies them of a suspected
assault by a spurned boy-friend. Carried out properly, this choice would
involve trade-offs between the marginal cost of overtime pay for extra
police protection in view of the expected benefits of providing the service,
and existing demands on the allocation of limited police resources to
crime detection, traffic control, public education, and other requests for
special protection."" Unless we can value the demand for these goods,
ascertain the costs of supplying them, and determine whether we should
have substituted the complainant's good for the good that was produced,
we cannot determine whether the decision was inefficient o r efficient.
Thus, if one assumes that the government is motivated to maximize social
welfare, it does not seem feasible to establish a comprehensive review
process that could effectively review the decisions of the government to
determine whether the choices generated efficient outcomes.'"
i 19

120

I2I

This, of course, is the explanation for the development of doctrinal rules that attempt
to distinguish 'policy-making' and the choice of government objectives from 'implementation' and execution of the policy. One of the first indications that the courts
would immunize the former from judicial review in compensation claims was Anns v.
Merton London Borough Council [1g78] AC 728. I have criticized the development of this
'discretionary' exemption, as it is sometimes called, not only for its indeterminacy but
also for its nai'vety in assuming a hierarchical structure and a formal discontinuity
between stages in the design and production of regulatory goods. See D. Cohen 'The
Public and Private Law Dimensions of the UFFI Problem'(1983-4) 8 Can. B w . LJ4 10.In
recent decisions courts in Australia and England have rejected this aspect of Anns and
replaced it with an equally abstruse concept. See, for example, Governors of the Peabody
Donation Fund v. Sir Lindray Parkinson and Co. Ltd [ I9851 I AC 2 lo.
See RiFs v. City o f N m York 240 N E 2d 860 (1g68), and Bass v. City of New York 330 N Y S 2d
569 (1972)~affd 300 NE 2d 154 (1973) (no liability on housing authority for failure
adequately to protect physical safety of young girl assaulted on authority property). See
also K.C. Davis Discretiona~Jurtice(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press
1969) 80-8, 162-9.
One possible solution to the problem of determining whether government action is
efficient would be to adopt a strict liability rule in which the only relevant criterion for
compensation would be a demonstration of a sufficient causal relationship between
government action (or inaction) and the claimants' losses. I do not mean to
underestimate the difficulties associated with reaching conclusions about causal
relations. And no one can possibly believe that mono-causality is operating in the case of
state wrongs.
None the less, strict liability would reduce, though it would not avoid, the
administrative costs of determining inefficient state action, and would shift the
efficiency determination to the state. Under certain assumptions (which might not hold
true in a significant number of cases), the state would respond by adopting efficient
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THE MARGINAL BENEFITS OF LIABILITY RULES

In the case of private torts, liability rules operate and should be evaluated
in the context of the market as a regulatory tool. If the market is working
perfe~tly,'~'tort law is unnecessary if all one cares about is primary
accident-costavoidance. Similarly, in the case of public torts, liability rules
operate in the context of the political market as a regulatory tool. The
political market, however, is not examined and evaluated easily, and it
may not operate in the same fashion across the bureaucracy."3
Yet the political market in its various guises may justify state and
bureaucratic immunity if it is operating effectively as a cost-internalization
mechanism. For example, it has been argued that it is unnecessary to
impose liability on some bureaucrats since they are subject to parliamentary ac~ountability."~It has also been suggested that it is unnecessary to
provide damage actions against some elected officials in view of their
regulation by electoral markets."5 Although there have been isolated
instances of legislative compensation in the case of mass tort victimization'16 and banking failures,"7 the transaction costs of legislative action
suggest that it is a highly imperfect alternative to liability rules. Whether
parliamentary review takes place ex ante through ongoing reporting and
accident-reduction measures and shifting residual costs to its constituents. While this
might be attractive in some instances of state action, the proposal implicitly assumes
that the state is not taking those losses into account ex ante. Thus it solves the problem,
but only after rejecting the assumption that led to the problem in the first place.
There may be persuasive reasons to implement 'no-fault' loss-compensation programs in respect of certain state activities. See Schuck, supra note 57, I 12-13. But if
one assumes that the government is taking into account social costs, strict liability would
not be the optimal liability rule.
1 2 2 That is, where there are no transaction or enforcement costs, all losses, victims, and
injurers are identifiable immediately and at no cost, and all losses are shifted
immediately and at no cost.
I 23 Perhaps the most significant aspect of at least some aspects of the political market is that
it operates in secret, making it next to impossible to evaluate its effectiveness. As well,
some bureaucracies, including the judiciary and prosecutorial officers, are valuable
precisley because of their relative independence from direct political influence.
124 A dramatic example of this argument was Justice Powell's suggestion that the possibility
of impeachment was evidence of the historical immunity of President Nixon. See
Fitzgeraldv. Niron supra note 66,2705. See also W. Gourlie 'Role of the Prosecutor: Fair
Minister of Justice with Firm Convictions' (1982) 16 UBCLR 395, at 300.
I 25 See Fitzgwald v. Nixon supra note 66, 2705-6.
126 Possibly the most famous example of legislative review giving rise to compensation is In
re Texas City DtFaFter Litigation (a District Court awarded judgment to plaintiffs; a Court
of Appeal reversed, 197 F. 2d 771; affirmed sub no. Dalehite v. United States 346 U.S. 15
(1953)),where Congress awarded up to $25,000 per claimant for losses arising out of
the explosion of fertilizer with an ammonium nitrate base at Texas City, Texas, in April
1947. See Texas City, Texas Disaster Claims, PL 378, stat. 707 (1955). The American
Supreme Court had denied compensation under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 u s c ,
ss. 1346, 2671-8, and 2680. See also A.W. Reitze 'Federal Compensation for
Vaccination Induced Injuries' ( I 986) I 3 Boston Coll. Env. Aff. LR I 69.
127 Financial Intitution DepositorsCompensation Act, sc 1986, introduced in the House of
Commons on 7 October I 985
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budgetary review, or ex post through reporting in the Public Accounts, it
is fair to say that political review of discretionary powers is weaker than
review of other aspects of administrative behaviour.""n
the light of the
random impact of tort victimization and in the absence of an organized
political focus for tort victims, that intuition seems to be justified. Again
empirical data are unavailable to support this assessment."g
A second potential regulatory instrument is judicial review in its
traditional administrative guise. But again, most investigators of the
administrative process have concluded that judicial review is not an
effective regulatory to01.'~" Even if it were, judicial review resulting in
bureaucratic decisions being declared unenforceable does not result in
loss-shifting.'3'
A third 'political' accountability mechanism may be professional norms
of conduct - the values and attitudes that are internalized as part of
bureaucratic training and experience.13' It may be true that this is the
most powerful control mechanism; it has the additional benefit of being
self-enforcing. Where the bureaucratic process is characterized by
professional norms, the necessity ofjudicial regulation through tort law is
questionable, since behaviour is shaped and modified by internalized
norms of conduct. The internal regulatory methods by which subordinates are controlled by superiors take the form of formal rules that
support the professional norms; they represent hierarchical control within
128 F. Slatter Parliament and Administrative Agencies working paper (Ottawa: Law Reform
Commission of Canada I 982) 38-4 1, I 14
izg It should be noted that critics of parliamentary accountability accept its theoretical
possibility but argue that as a practical matter street-level bureaucrats operate in a
manner which necessarily means that they are unconstrained by legislative review. See
Law Society of Upper Canada Report on the Abwe of Power and the Role of a n Independent
Judicial System in its Regulation and Control (Toronto: De Boo 1979) at 61 I .
130 This is especially so in the case of those bureaucrats whose decision-making has been
declared unreviewable by the courts. Again, prosecutorial discretion comes within this
class. See Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [ig78] AC 435; Nelles v. Ontario, supra
note 66. Moreover, cases such as R. v. Rourke (1977) 38 CRNS 268,35 ccc (nd) I 29 (scc)
suggest that Canadian judges are reluctant to review certain bureaucratic decisions
except in the most egregious circumstances. It is true that since Rourke Canadianjudges
have engaged in judicial review of prosecutorial decisions, but notwithstanding John
Edwards' confidence that this is an effective regulatory tool, it seems thatjudges are still
hesitant to impose sanctions on bureaucrats, at least in this context. SeeJ.LI.J. Edwards
The Attorney General, Politics and the Public Interest (London: Sweet and Maxwell I 984) at
120.
131 See Bosadu v. Pinos (1984) 5 DLR (4th) 334, at 338 (Ont. HC).
132 This point has been made by both supporters and critics of bureaucratic immunity. See
K. Turner 'The Role of Crown Counsel in Canadian Prosecutions' (1962)40 Can. Bar
Rev. 439; Boucher v. The Queen (1954) 110 ccc 263, at 270 (scc), per Rand J , who
described the public duty of Crown prosecutors. One can compare these remarks with
those of Mark Tushnet in 'The Constitution of the Bureaucratic State' ( I 984) 86 W. Va.
LR 1077.
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the agency through rules and norms and an alternative to control by
external agencies.'33 Paradigmatic cases include public prosecutorial
decision-making, judging, and law enforcement investigation. In these
cases bureaucratic incentives are professional rather than economic, and
the norms that establish and define what prosecutors, police, and judges
ought to do are internalized through training and institutional constraints. If this is so, then damage awards against the state are unlikely to
influence bureaucratic behaviour.
Yet professional norms might not coincide with efficient loss-reducing
decisions. For example, in the case of 'prosecutor-bureaucrats' a relevant
norm might be the win-loss ratio of the individual prosecutor.lS4 There is
no reason to believe that this necessarily coincides or is even directly
related to a socially optimal decision criterion, and there is the risk that
prosecutorial decisions constrained by professional norms of conduct will
lead to decisions to prosecute individuals whom the bureaucrat thinks she
will be able to convict, rather than individuals 'ought' to be prosecuted.'35
Even this cursory review of the current 'political' markets that might be
operating to internalize social costs suggests that they do not work
'perfectly.' None the less, to the extent that they do, we focus on the
marginal benefits associated with state liability, and should hesitate to
impose liability without a thorough analysis of the costs and benefits of
existing and alternative accountability mechanisms.
IV

Responses of the state to liability rules

In part I I described the arguments against the imposition of personal
bureaucratic liability, and suggested tentatively that direct state liability
might be the preferred regulatory instrument when the objective is to
reduce the incidence and consequences of state-caused losses. In part 11 I
argued that such a proposal is attractive only when one assumes
133 Tushnet, supra, 1095-6. T h e bureaucratic process is neither utilitarian nor contractarian, but is characterized by 'decisions [made] in light of profesisonal norms.'
134 See B.A. Grossman 'Conflict and Compromise in the Criminal Courts: New Directions
in Legal Research' (1968) I i Crim. LQ 292, at 294.
135 R.H.
Jackson makes this point in 'The Federal Prosecutor' (1940) 24 J. of Adm. Jud. Soc.
18, at 19. It is true that nothing is wrong per se with decisions to prosecute that are
based on the probability of convictions. None the less, other variables, including the
likelihood of future criminal activity and the attitude of the public to the crime and to
convictions, are ignored in the calculus.
The problem is one of conflicting incentives. The prosecutor may react to internal
departmental budgetary and administrative signals that demand productivity, and not
to the invisible signals from the victims of those decisions - persons who ought not to
have been prosecuted in view of the social benefits associated with their incarceration,
and persons who are victims of criminals who ought to have been prosecuted.
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inefficient state action. In part 111 I argued that even in cases of inefficient
state action, liability rules may be undesirable in view of their costs and the
existing legal regulatory instruments. Here I argue that even in the case
of inefficient state action, liability rules may be undesirable given the
ability of the state to 'externalize' losses across taxpayers.
Richard Posner is the strongest proponent of the application of tort law
to state action; he recommends the use of liability rules to regulate
government action in a number of contexts.'37 Posner suggests that
traditional doctrines intended to influence bureaucratic behaviour in the
context of law enforcement activities - including the entrapment defence
and the exclusionary rule - are themselves inefficient, and ought to be
replaced by tort damage actions against the government.'" It is not easy to
dismiss the claim that non-monetary remedies are inefficient. Such
remedies generate the dead-weight losses associated with the imposition
of sanctions which reduce social welfare without an associated gain in
deterrence,'39 and which may over-deter the regulated conduct.'4"
None the less, the critical assumption behind such recommendations is
that the government reacts to liability rules as a private economic actor
would. I n contrast, a 'no liability' rule is optima114' when one assumes that
the government and bureaucratic agencies will not react to economic
incentives. That is, only if one assumes that the state, like a private firm, is
constrained by relatively efficient markets in labour, products and capital
can one predict that the state will react to liability risks by adopting
efficient accident-reduction measures.'4'
136 Of course, all of this assumes that the only relevant state objective is to engage in the
efficient delivery of regulatory benefits. We can certainly justify liability rules when we
want to achieve other objectives - recognizing and protecting 'rights,' providing for
loss-spreading engaging in public insurance programs, and so on.
137 See Posner 'Rethinking the Fourth Amendment' supra note 59 and Posner 'Excessive
Sanctions' ibid. 635-6, and C. Foote 'Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual
Rights' (1955) 39 Minn. LR 493.
138 Although Posner recognizes the problems associated with personal bureacratic liability,
his suggestion of government liability on the basis of respondeat superior doctrines
without rights of indemnification assumes that the threat of liability would give the
agency 'an incentive to prevent misconduct by its officers': 'Excessive Sanctions' supra
note 59, 64 I .
139 G.S. Becker 'Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach' (1968)76J . of Pol. Econ.
169; R.A. Posner 'Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals' (1980) 17 Am. Crim.
L R 409, at 4 10.
140 The inefficiency of over-deterrence is represented by the opportunity costs of the
regulatory benefits that are not produced as a result of bureaucratic inaction: Posner
'Excessive Sanctions' supra note 59,637. See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co.
438 us. 422, at 440-3 (1978).
141 See Posner, 'Rethinking the Fourth Amendment' supra note 59, 66.
142 See D.N. Dewees 'Regulating Environmental Quality' in D.N. Dewees (ed.) The
Regulation of Quulity: Products, Services, Workplaces, and the Environment (Toronto:
Butterworths 1983) 153; W..J. Baumol and W.E. Oates Economics, Environmental Policy,
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In theory, internal accident-reduction measures are a likely response to
liabilityrules applied by an exogenous review institution.'43 Risk management would involve superior agencies' assuming responsibility for
detecting, identifying, and controlling the risk-increasing activities in
which its subordinate departments and employees engage. Accident costs
would be minimized to the extent that efficient risk-management
measures could be designed and implemented, and insurance arrangements would be implemented to spread losses over time and large
numbers of insured parties.'44 Moreover, because judges would not
directly regulate agency policy o r implementation, there would be a
reduced risk that the judiciary would find itself running government
programs. '45
Government responses to accident risks would conceivably include an
~
the adoption of
internal system of administrative d i ~ c i p l i n e ' 4and
decision-making structures sensitive to the expected accident costs of state
action.'47 Governments faced with liability risks could be expected to
and the Quality ofLife (Englewood Cliffs, N J : Prentice-Hall 1979); and A. Alchian and H.
Demsetz 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization' (1972) 62 Am.
Econ. Rev. 77.
143 At the very least one would avoid the administrative costs associated with teaching
judges how they might reform the bureaucratic process to minimize the expected costs
of government action, and it is a fair assumption that the senior bureaucrats will get it
right more often than judges, even after that educative process.
There seems to be very little empirical data describing the response of bureaucracies
to liabilty risks. A review of Canadian Public Policy up to 1985, Canadian Public
Administration to the spring of 1986, the Jounull of Political Economy from 1965 to 1985,
and the J o u m l of Public Economics from 1965 to 1985 uncovered no relevant material.
Two articles on municipal risk management were anecdotal rather than theoretical or
empirical: see R. Breber 'Are Risk Managers Needed in Cities?' (1985) 67 Public
Management 7, and 'Risk Management' (1978) 60 Public Management.
A special issue of Public Administration Review was devoted to government liability, but
the articles on tort losses were not particularly useful. See (1985) 45 Public Administration Review 742.
144 It would be highly unusual for central governments to obtain market insurance in
respect of regulatory risks; the ability of the insurer to predict and evaluate the risks,
and to pool and spread the losses, probably would be inferior to the insured's.
However, governments whose tax base and authority are constrained may very well
obtain market insurance in respect of 'non-governmental' risks. See, for example, Risk
Retention Act, 15 usc, ss. 390 1 et seq., as amended. Congressional amendments in 1986
for the extension of risk-retention benefits to all state
provided in s. 3goi(a)(s)(~)(ii)
and local government activities.
145 As Peter Schuck notes, it is unlikely that courts, or indeed any institution that designs
and implements tort remedies, could be sensitive to the demands of the immense range
of functions in which the government is engaged, design effective deterrent mechanisms suited to those contexts, and implement and monitor them at the street level:
supra note 57, 103.
146 See Bermann, supra note 24, 1202.
147 Michael Trebilcock and Douglas Hartle develop this idea in the context of regulatory
costs in 'Regulatory Reform and the Political Process' (1982) 2 0 Osgoode Hall LJ 643.
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implement risk management measures to monitor and identify potential
exposure and to reduce the probability and magnitude of expected losses
through internal management decision~.'4~
These responses might involve improved training and employee selection programs, and the
adoption of remuneration practices linking accident costs to salaries and
However, analyses of damage claims against the federal government
over recent years and of the budgetary and payment mechanisms within
the federal government suggest that the state cannot be assimilated to the
position of a private firm. T h e current internal administrative systems
bperating at the federal level of government supports the view that the
response of the government to legal liability risks will not generate a
reduction in accident costs. T h e incentive effect of potential or actual
legal liability on a particular department should depend, to a considerable
148 Current risk management procedures in use in federal bureaucracies are described in
chapters 320,53o,j31, and 532 of the Treasuly Board Manual. In chapter 320 (entitled
'Risk Management') government departments are directed to record information
relating to the number, type, and dollar value of harmful or damagingoccurrences; the
annual number of claims by type and location; security infractions by type and location;
and the annual dollar value of any insurance purchases. Risks to government assets and
risks to government personnel are dealt with in chapter 530 ("Management of Risk Generally'). In identifying risks, departments are directed to assess damaging agents,
including human and physical factors, and to distinguish between risks peculiar to
government and general risks. Departments are then directed to engage in riskminimization efforts, including risk avoidance, options designed to minimize the
financial consequences of accidents, and special employment practices, including
safety, prevention, and training. Chapter 530 also provides directions on loss
containment and the avoidance of fire risks through compliance with standards.
Chapter 53 I ("Management of Risk - Underwriting') describes government insurance
practices. Fire and automobile risks are self-insured. Exceptions to this self-insurance
presumption include cars at foreign posts and steam boilers. The government does not
maintain a fund dedicated to underwriting risks, and funding is generally the direct
responsibility of the individual department which generates the accident. There is
interim financing available to a department if extreme financial difficulty arises, but
advances received are expected to be repaid through supplementary or future
appropriations. Chapter 532 ("Management of Risk CompensationlRestoration')
describes claims investigation procedures. Restoration and compensation for intradepartmental incidents are delegated to the department. When a major incident occurs
between departments, the Treasury Board considers departmental submissions, and
when disputes arise it obtains opinions from the Department of Justice. Claims
regulations are followed for tort claims, with the exception of defalcation by public
officials.
149 See M.J. Jaron 'The Threat of Personal Liability under the Federal Civil Rights Act:
Does It Interfere with the Performance of State and Local Government?'(lg8 I ) 13 Urb.
Lauyer I , at 21-2. F. Heffron and N. McFeeley The Adminirtrative Regulatory Process
(New York: Longman 1983) at 331; Newman 'Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to
Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct' (1978)
87 Yale LJ 447, at 457; and P.C. Weiler 'The Control of Police Arrest Practices:
Reflections of a Tort Lawyer' in A. Linden (ed.) Studies in Canadian Tort Law (Toronto:
Butterworths 1968) at 445-6.
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degree, on the proportional impact of the costs of legal liability o n the
department's operating budget. Actual legal exposure (not including the
costs of legal work) never exceeds 0.2 per cent (11500) of a departmental
budget. '5"see the accompanying table.)
Furthermore, in departments where liability approaches that percentage, most of the liability costs represent property and automobile damage
claims.'5' There is no reason to believe that government employees drive
more negligently than employees of private firms, and it does not appear
that the costs of accidents are a result of government inefficiency.'5* For
several departments with relatively large-legal costs, this type of liability
(damage claims for vehicle accidents) is one in which the incentive effect
of financial costs on accidents is notoriously difficult to determine, and is
indeed the object of much scepticism.'53 Thus, it seems reasonable for the
department to view these costs as an operating cost and not to treat them
as a tort liability amenable to risk-management procedures peculiar to
government.
In any case, the data suggest
that legal liability costs are probably not of
major concern to any particular department in determining its budgetary
estimates. Those estimates are never resolved within 1 per cent at the start
of the fiscal year.'54 Further, the cost of legal liability as a category of
expenditure is never distinctly considered,'55 but is assumed in current
departmental budgets as a component of general operating costs. It is
-

I 50

The table was compiled from Receiver General for Canada Public Accounts of Canada,
1983-1984 and Public Accounts of Canada, 1984-1985 (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and
Services 1984, 1985). Details of damage claims, ex gratia payments, and Federal Court
awards are in section 33 of vol. 2 of both years. Annual budgetary appropriations
(non-statutory) are listed by department in table 2 of the introduction to vol. 2 of both
years.
151 In the case of the Departments of National Defence and Transport, automobile
accidents predominate. Property damage and automobile accidents represent the vast
majority of claims involving the RCMP in the Department of the Solicitor General.
152 A comparison of the number of accidents per miles driven between private firms and
the government would be required to demonstrate inefficiency. Since the government
is a self-insurer, there is no independent assessment of accident claims by which to
assess premium rates.
153 See M.A. Franklin 'Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Compensation and Selective
Reimbursement' (1967) 53 Va. LR 774.
154 D.G. Hartle The Expenditure Budget Process in the Government of Canada (Toronto:
Canadian Tax Foundation 1978) 40; Public Accounts supra note 150, VOI.I, section 4,
table 4.3, 'Estimates and Appropriations' of both years. Several supplementary
estimates are commonly made through the course of the year.
155 Telephone conversation I I July 1986 with Allan Darling of the Programme Branch of
Treasury Board. Mr Darling also stated that there had been no recent demands for
funds for legal purposes in supplementary estimates. A further telephone conversation
on 15July 1986 with L. Endemann, Treasury Board officer for the Department of
Justice, confirmed that to his knowledge funds for legal liability are never found in the
main estimates.
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unlikely that the budgetary process would entail financial recognition of
particular legal liability costs.
THE STATE'S CAPITAL MARKETS

One explanation of the data is that the constraints on the ability of
governments to raise funds are radically different from the constraints
that efficient capital markets theoretically place on private firms. If we
relax the assumption that the state will react to liability risks in the same
manner as a private firm, it is not as clear that the adoption of a direct state
liability rule is desirable - and it is fair to say that the assumption is
difficult to support. It is trite that central governments are not constrained by the same markets as private economic actors, and thus
effective public policy analysis of government liability should employ very
different as~umptions.'5~
156 I point out later that if attention is focused on municipal governments, fiscally

independent sub-units of governments, and the like, the effect of liability rules is more
likely to track the effect I predict in private markets.
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Our ability to use economic sanctions in the case of private firms is
effectively limited by several factors, including a restriction on the size of
sanctions in view of our ideas about equal treatment, the social costs of
bankruptcy if damage awards are raised to a sufficient level, and the
increasing marginal costs of increasing fines coupled with decreasing
marginal benefits.157 It is equally true that the utility of economic
sanctions in the case of the state will be limited by a range of factors, which,
while different from those operating in the private sector, are equally
relevant to our analysis. In the end we must begin to think about the way
in which the state reacts or will react to economic signals imposed by
courts.
One assumption underlying the response of private firms to economic
signals is that competition among private firms in capital markets defines
winners and losers, and hence inefficient or efficient behaviour. Governments, however, are the only game in town, and that town is unique.
Although comparisons between different administrations in different
jurisdictions are undoubtedly valuable, such comparisons, given the
differing political climates, resource bases, histories, and social situations
of nations, can never be definitive of 'efficient' action. Therefore, the state
is not subject to the constraints of a capital market, and it is unable to apply
the lessons that have been learned by private firms in the competition for
capital.
Decisions to allocate losses in governments must be sensitive to the
appropriation process by which administrative units obtain their capital
requirements for current and future programs. Under certain assumptions we might think that administrative units will be responsive to liability
rules. That is, we might assume that competition among bureaucracies for
legislative appropriations is analogous to the competition of private
enterprise in capital markets.15' Government appropriation decisions
would reflect an assessment of the return to the social welfare on the
public's capital investment for the previous budgetary period, and the
public's prediction of its expected return for the current period. Where
the appropriation process operates in this fashion, the imposition of losses
will result in a reduced ability of the bureaucracy to raise funds. Damage
payments and associated transaction costs associated with tort claims will
reduce the regulatory benefits otherwise achievable by the relevant depart157 See Kraakman, supra note 71,881. Many o f these ideas are developed by Christopher
Stone in Where the Law End.: The Social Control of Corporate Behaviour (New York: Harper
and Row 1975) chapter 6.
158 See R.A. Posner 'The Behaviour of Administrative Agencies' (1972)I J. of Legal Studies
305, at 323-44, and Posner 'Theories of Economic Regulation' (1974) 5 BellJ. Econ.
335.
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ment.'59 TOthe extent that the ability of particular units to obtain capital
is influenced and monitored by the suppliers of financial resources, we
can expect that the imposition of liability will have incentive effects.
One immediate problem with applying this model is the difficulty in
measuring the inefficiencies associated with government negligence. It is
almost impossible for owners of the state to assess whether their agents are
generating maximum returns on their 'tax' investments. If citizens could
evaluate outputs, then inefficient inputs (which would include social costs
associated with the production of public goods and which would be
reflected in a reduction of outputs) could be monitored and responded to
in the same way that actors in finance markets respond to inefficiencies in
private firms. In that world we would enjoy the perfectly efficient state
(whatever that means), and liability rules would be irrelevant.
It is safe to assume that what I call 'political capital markets' represented by the activities of senior bureaucrats and politicians, as
agents of taxpayers, in monitoring and evaluating the return on public
investments - are substantially less efficient than capital markets are in
the case of private investments. For example, under the accountability
mechanisms developed from the Lambert Commission recommendat i o n ~ , ' ~the
" allocation of resources through the budgetary process
involves two stages. T h e first is the establishment of priorities and overall
expenditure and revenue figures by centralized federal authorities; the
second is the allocation of revenues among competing departments and
programs employing the so-called envelope system. The overall level of
expenditure is determined in the light of government fiscal strategy and
available projected revenues, and then resources are allocated through
competition among various policy committees representing departments
and agencies. While this budgetary allocation process may result in the
alignment of departmental budget proposals with overall fiscal policy, it
fails to deal with the problem of ensuring that losses allocated to a
particular department influence budgetary appropriations.
159 See C.R. Wise 'Liability of Federal Officials: An Analysis of Alternatives'(lg83) 45 Pub.
Admin. Rev. 746, at 751. Wise suggests that, in the context of developing an
indemnification fund for individuals who commit constitutional torts, the charges that
each agency incurs should appear on their budgets, and that an officer of the Office of
Management and Budget should be on the fund's board. See also S.G. Hadden (ed.)
Risk Analysis, Institutions and Public Policy (Port Washington, N Y : Associated Faculty
Press 1984) 5, 34-5.64-5.
160 The Royal Commission on Financial Management and Accountability (the Lambert
Commission) was appointed in 1976 to examine financial management policy and
practices in the federal bureaucracy, with specific reference to effective financial
accountability. T h e commission issued its report in 1979:Final Report, Royal Commicsion
on Financial Management and Accountability (Hull, PQ: Canadian Government Publishing
Centre 1979).
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The federal government expenditure budget process begins approximately one and a half years before the fiscal year for which the budget is
intended.16' It involves negotiations within a department, with the
Treasury Board Secretariat, and with the Treasury Board itself, and
continues through the fiscal year in which the budget is actualized
through supplementary estimates.l6* A departmental budget consists of
two major components. T h e first is an A budget, which funds existing
programs at the same level as the previous fiscal year, taking changes into
account. It includes regular operating expenditures, including damage
claims against the Crown arising out of the departmental activities. T h e
second is a B budget, which comprises proposals for new funds required
for the implementation of new programs or the enhancement of existing
ones. In practice, the A budget is seldom closely scrutinized, except
intradepartmentally when an assessment of a long-standing program is
undertaken, usually with a view to enhancing the program or replacing it
with a more extensive one. T h e A budget programs are rarely analysed, as
in zero-based budgeting, to determine present efficiency.163Until very
recently, the A budget submitted by line departments representing
current program allocations was considered politically sacrosanct, and
only the B budget representing proposed programs would be subject to
budgetary review in any meaningful sense of the term.I64
Even assuming that damage claims were allocated to the appropriate
unit with government, it is likely that they would be considered expenditures related to ongoing programs, and would simply be ammunition for
increased A-budget allocation arguments. In the end, losses would be
passed on to o w n e r - t a ~ ~ a ~ e r sThus,
. ' ~ 5 the incentive effects of liability
rules must be predicated on implementing budgetary reforms to ensure a
level of scrutiny that would reveal legal liability risks. Incentives will be
generated only if we design a system to appraise and measure program
results (including tort losses), and link those results to the budgetary
process. In other words, for losses to be internalized, program execution
161 Hartle, supra note 1 5 4 ~ 3 4 - 6This description is accurate, even taking into account the
significant procedural and structural reforms of the budget setting and review process
that have taken place in recent years. See Hartle 'The Expenditure Budget Process of
the Government of Canada: A Public Choice-Rent-Seeking Perspective' Canadian Tax
Paper no. 81 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation 1988) 101-7 and 134-47.
162 Hartle, supra note 154.34-6
163 Ibid. 38,41,42-3
164 See A. Wildavsky The Politics of theBudgetary Process gd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown 1979)
and G.B. Doern and R.W. Phidd Canadian Public Policy: I&m, Stmture, Process
(Toronto: Methuen 1983) 262-3.
165 It is likely that other aspects of the Lambert Commission proposals dealing with policy
and expenditure management and with accountability within the public service would,
if properly implemented, reduce that problem.
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- the delivery of regulatory benefits (with their associated costs) - must be
linked to resource allocation in the budgetary process.'66
A slightly different perspective on the response of the government to
liability focuses on the choice of payment mechanism, which theoretically
offers an alternative source of regulatory control. Federal Court awards
are defined as statutory payments pursuant to the Federal Court Act, and
damage awards ordered to be paid by the federal government in Federal
Court judgments are paid out of the consolidated revenue fund.167 The
Public Accounts records judgments by department, but the funds paid out
of the consolidated revenue fund are not charged to particular departmental budgets.16' Unless internal administrative steps are adopted to
allocate this loss to a particular department o r other subsidiary of
government, it is unlikely that the risk of liability will be relevant in
departmental decision-making.
The impact of liability rules may also be influenced by the design of the
settlement process within government. A range of institutional and
procedural mechanisms regulate settlements of Federal Court claims,
and it is clear that the impact of liability rules will be influenced by the
design of the settlement process in government institutions.169 Under the
claims regulations enacted pursuant to the federal Financial Administration Act,''" settlements of claims where the total amount of all claims
arising out of the same matter is less than $200,000 can be made only by
166 In a sense, the Lambert Commission recognized that some link was necessary, but the
overall impression one gets from the report is that the central authorities should leave
management to management. The commission suggests that after allocating resources
to departments, the central expenditure-allocating authority should permit 'individual
departments and agencies to manage their affairs in a way that will best achieve the
objectives assigned to them with the resources available': Final Report, supra not 148,
64.
None the less, the commission did recognize that effectiveness-evaluation of
programs was necessary, and recommended the establishment of a Board of
Management to replace the Treasury Board, with responsibility lodged in a Financial
Management Secretariat to ensure the effective management of departmental and
agency financial resources. See O.P. Dwivedi 'On Holding Public Servants Accountable' in O.P. Dwivedi (ed.) The Administrative State in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press 1982) 159.
167 ~ s 1970
c
nd Supp., c. F-lo, ss. 55(2), 57(3), and j n
168 Telephone conversation 4 July 1986 with M. Duffy, Toronto regional office of Federal
Department of Justice
I
169 It is a fair assumption that the number and magnitude of settled claims far exceeds the
number and financial impact of court judgments.
170 Claims Regulations, CRC 1978, c. 683, amended S O R / ~ Z - ~ Opursuant
~,
to the Financial
Administration Act, ~ s 1970,
c
C. F-10, S.6. The claims regulatlonscited above indicate a
limit of $50,000. However, Robin Findlay of the Office of the Controller General, in a
discussion with me on 15July 1986, indicated that the limit was raised to $2oo,ooo to
reflect enhanced ministerial responsibility. See SOR/86- 10 14, part 11 Canada Gazette vol.
I 2 0 , no. 22.
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the department after an opinion is obtained from the deputy attorney
general. Claims exceeding $2oo,ooo are payable only with Treasury
Board approval. In practice, however, claims are 'settled' by means of
consent orders from Federal Court judges, which, like Federal Court
awards,'7' are paid out of the consolidated revenue fund, and do not have
an impact on specific departmental budgets.'7'
Unless internal administrative steps are adopted to allocate these
settlement payments to a particular department or other subsidiary
government unit, it is unlikely that the risk of liability will be relevant in
departmental decision-making. Assuming that the response of a department to economic risks that are focused on its budget is different from its
response when the risks are shifted to the consolidated revenue fund, the
impact of liability rules will differ, depending on the magnitude of the
losses they generate. Under the current settlement processes, relatively
small losses may have substantially greater effects on departmental
behaviour than significant losses that are allocated to general revenues.
As a general policy, the internalization of social costs is likely to be
achieved only if both damage awards and settlements are paid out of
departmental budgets and are not shifted to general revenues.
Finally, there are damage claims that are made against particular
departments but are not pursued through the Federal Court. Demands
for compensation from the government in situations where liability may
be impossible to establish, or where liability on the government's part is
non-existent, but where, for unarticulated reasons, compensation is
indicated, may be dealt with through a system of formally authorized ex
gratia payments. These payments are not made as a response to potential
legal liability, and, like damage awards and settlement 'consent' orders,
are made out of the consolidated revenue fund.'73
The ultimate financial control of all of these government expenditures
- that is, ex gratia payments, damages awards, and settlements - resides
with the Treasury Board, which is made u p of five ministers of the
Crown.'74 The secretariat of the Treasury Board provides the board with
171 Telephone conversation, 7 July 1986 with Paul Olivier, secretary to the Commission of
Inquiry into Certain Banking Matters, and retired associate deputy minister of the
Department of Justice
172 Similar institutional mechanisms operate in the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 usc, ss. 2672,2677, and 2678 ( 1970).This act permits an agency to settle
claims up to $ag,ooo, and it seems that costs up to $25,000 would be allocated to the
agency budget. These claims are not subject to an opinion from the Justice
Department. Larger claims are paid from general revenues, but for claims greater than
$25,000 a legal opinion from the United States Department of Justice is required.
173 Robin Findlay, supra note I 70
174 Financial Administration Act, supra note 170, s. ~ ( 2 )
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the detailed information and budgetary analysis necessary to support the
board in its decisions.'75 While secretariat resources might be used in
establishing a feedback mechanism for damage awards, discussions with
the Treasury Board's financial officer to the Department of Justice
indicate that the board does not undertake a careful examination of
specific financial losses associated with legal liability. Such monitoring
would be expensive, and, given the magnitude of current exposure, yields
data that are of minimal relevance to the funding decisions of the
7~
discussions with the Treasury Board's
Treasury ~ o a r d . 1Furthermore,
expenditure analysis group indicate that in general there is no assessment
of settlement payments. T h e Treasury Board analysis has usually focused
on macroeconomic issues and has not been applied to expenditures of the
type and magnitude associated with current legal liability risks.'77
In addition to the potential impact of awards and settlements, legal
liability risks might be signalled through the impact of the cost of legal
services. All departments retain legal counsel whose function is much like
that of lawyers employed by private firms: the department acts as a client,
and decides how and whether to use counsel's advice.'7' Almost all
litigation, however, is undertaken by Department of Justice 1 a ~ y e r s . l ~ ~
Payment of large settlements and litigation decisions are made after
consultation between the departments. None the less, it seems clear that
the legal expertise of Department of Justice lawyers predominates, and
the conduct of litigation is controlled by that department.'*^ The
Department of Justice funds the litigation, and other departmental
budgets are not affected by the costs of litigation services.'"
One can conclude that the collective impact of the current treatment of
legal liability costs to the government (which includes budgetary allocation mechanisms, Treasury Board review, the payment of damage claims,
settlements, and ex gratia payments from the consolidated revenue fund,
and the allocation of legal costs to the Department of Justice) presents the
175 Hartle, supre note 154. 15
176 L. Endemann, supra note 155
177 Telephone conversation 15July 1986with F. Lane, group chief of expenditure policy
and planning analysis of the Treasury Board
178 Telephone conversation 14 July 1986 with Mr Heiss of the legal department of
I
Transport Canada
179 An exception is tax litigation, where the Department of National Revenue employs its
own litigation specialists. Departments will also pay out of their own budgets for private
sector legal advisers hired on an ad hoc basis: L. Endemann, supra note 155.
180 Paul Olivier, supra note I 7 I
181 An officer of the Treasury Board's expenditure analysis group stated that there was no
assessment of legal work costs or the payment of settlements. T h e allocation of legal
costs would be subject to negotiation between individual departments and the
Department of Justice: F. Lane, supra note I 77.
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government with a 'capital market' very different from that faced by
private firms. The description of these mechanisms suggests that legal
liability will have only attenuated incentive effects in the absence of
additional mechanisms within government which would reallocate that
liability to individual departmental budgets. No institutional mechanism
currently operating within the federal government bureaucracy achieves
that goal. Any reduction in primary accident costs would require much
more sensitive financial control in government, as well as the uncoerced
co-operation of the relevant departments.
LIMITING FACTORS

Even if we were to redesign the budgetary approval process, link it with
auditing procedures that revealed contingent liability risks, and allocate
damage claims, settlement costs, exgratia payments, and legal expenses to
specific departments, we would still have to recognize the limiting factors
that operate in the case of governments (but do not operate in the case of
most private firms) and that influence our ability to use tort law as a
regulatory instrument."*
One critical factor affecting the instrumental impact of liability awards
is a reflection of the non-market characteristics of many public services
and goods. Those characteristics may mean that output reductions may
not occur in response to legal liability costs. We assume, in the case of
private firms, that increases in costs associated with liability awards, to the
extent that they are not reduced efficiently, are reflected in the price of
the firm's goods.'83 AS the price increases, demand is reduced, and the
absolute number of goods in the market will decrease. As the number of
goods decreases, aggregate accident costs also decrease.
However, governments often use non-market vehicles to distribute
public services. In such cases the output price may be zero; even when it is
not, in many cases the output price bears little or no relationship to c0st.'~4
If that is so, even if social costs represented by damage awards were
'internalized' to the government, there might not be any concomitant
reduction in output, and thus no reduction in accident costs associated
182 Many of these points reflect the 'bureaucratic' element o f public bureaucracies, and
thus are equally applicable to private, corporate bureaucratic conduct. See C.D. Stone
Where the Law Ends (New York: Harper and Row 1975) especially at 93-1 18.
183 That is, a firm faced with potential legal liability will take cost-effective accident
reduction measures to the point that the marginal benefit associated with the measures
equals the reduced liability exposure. All losses that are not thus avoided will be
incurred, and the price at which goods are sold will reflect both the cost of the efficient
accident-reduction-measures and the residual liability risks.
184 See W.F.Baxter 'Enterprise Liability, Public and Private' (1978) 42 Law &' Contemp.
Prob. 45, at 5 1 .
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with increased prices. In addition, it is not clear that it would be desirable,
given the objectives of the government programs, to reduce output even
if we would otherwise want to. Decision-makers who impose legal liability
on the government in an effort to reduce primary accident costs should
take into account that this element of primary accident costs reduction
may be absent in the case of state action.
A second limiting factor influencing the desirability of using tort law to
regulate public bureaucracies is the ability of the government to shift the
losses back to victims or other members of the public through retroactive
legislation. Perhaps the best-known example of this was the decision,
made first by the Tory government and then by the Labour government,
to enact the War Damage ~ c t " 5in England in 1965. That act retroactively
abolished the common law right to compensation for damage to property
associated with acts carried out by the government during or in
contemplation of the outbreak of war. T h e legislation was enacted in
response to a 1965 decision of the House of Lords in Burmah Oil Co. Ltd v.
Lord ~dvocate''~which had recognized a claim for over $loo million
dollars arising out of the destruction of the claimant's property during the
British retreat from Rangoon in 1942. The risk of such state retaliation
might be small, but it strengthens my thesis that attempts to internalize
losses associated with state action cannot be modelled on liability rules
designed for private firms.
The idea represented in Burmah Oil is central to an understanding of
the efficiency of government liability. The evaluation of compensation
payments and their associated incentive effects should acknowledge that
state liability necessarily involves the judiciary's directing the investment
of public resources in risk-reducing measures o r compensation payments
that would otherwise be allocated to achieving agency objectives. One can
expect that the agency will have a comparative advantage in determining
when the marginal costs of accident reduction investments exceed the
associated marginal benefits of those investments, and when alternative
uses of the resources will optimize social welfare.'''
A third limiting factor is the willingness and ability of the government
department or the government as an institution to shift losses to its
'owners' - that is, the tax-paying public. If the government is not
185 1 9 6 5 , ~18
.
186 [1965] AC 75. Apparently, the legislation was also motivated by the existence of several
other potential claimants in the same position as the Burmah Oil Company. See Note
'The Burmah Oil Affair' (1966) 79 Ham.LR 614.
187 This also assumes away the distorting effects of bureaucratic self-interest discussed in
the public choice literature. See the text accompanying notes 98-1 1 I supra.

Heinonline - - 40 U. Toronto L.J. 258 1990

REGULATING REGULATORS

259

constrained to operate at optimal levels of taxation"' and to adopt
optimal monetary policies, then all losses shifted to the government by the
courts can be shifted to the community, subject only to the marginal cost
in lost votes. If one assumes that tax and monetary policy as currently
formulated does not operate within constraints that are relevant at the
marginal dollar levels represented by tort losses, then liability rules
applied to governments'89 will have no impact on the behaviour of
bureaucrats, and will merely generate substantial transaction costs as
wealth is shifted from one group of (tort) victims to a second group of (tort
law) victims.'go
One way to understand whether and why the government will be likely
to pass on 'tort' costs is to evaluate the motives of the bureaucratic agency.
One model of bureaucratic organization postulates that bureaucracies
seek to maximize their expenditures.'Y1 In the absence of devices that use
the tax structure to control the 'tendencies of government to grow without
bound"g2 or effective central bureaucratic or legislative review to monitor
and regulate particular bureaucratic budgets, agencies that conform to
this model will always pass regulatory tort costs on to the tax-paying
public. In fact, if the judgment requires funds not currently appropriated,
the judicial order is implicitly directed against the legislatures or other
governmental unit controlling the expenditure process. Merely awarding
damages in these cases would only justify demands for additional bureau
funding.'93 If one assumes this model of government, then liability rules
will not generate increases in allocative efficiency.
A different model of bureaucracy that can be applied to predict the
188 Even if it were, it would be unrealistic to expect the courts to determine what the
optimal level of taxation is, and even more unrealistic to think that the courts could
determine whether the government was operating at the optimal level. There is
nothing which requires that we use courts as the review institution, but there is no
obvious institutional candidate that would be able effectively to carry out those tasks.
189 As discussed earlier, funds paid out in tort claims are taken from the consolidated
revenue fund. Under section 17(2) of the Federal Court Act, supra note 167, all
damage awards against the federal government are allocted to the consolidated
revenue fund.
190 The extent to which the state will pass costs on to the public depends on a number of
subsidiary variables, including taxation policy, fiscal policy, and the impact of taxation
decisions on investment, production, voting behaviour, and so on.
191 This model was developed more fully in part 2. See W.A. Niskanen J r Bureaucmcy and
Representative Government (Chicago: Aldine, Atherton 1971 ) and Niskanen 'Bureaucrats
and Politician's (1975) 18J . of Law and Econ. 6 17.
192 Mueller, supra note 23, 167
193 See Edelman v. Jordon 415 U.S.651 (1974) (decision to fashion award as a retroactive
injunction against state official requiring agency to dispense funds from treasury,
reversed). See Yudof, supra note 69, 1349 et seq.
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response of the government to the imposition of regulatory tort costs is
one in which bureaucrats are motivated to maximize their personal
welfare. In this world bureaucrats are expected to make choices that will
increase personal income, personal and institutional power, or personal
ideals of the public good. '94 Bureaucracies conforming to this model may
develop efficient accident-reduction policies - but only when the victims
of accidents are able to organize effectively and bring political pressure
(costs) to bear either directly o n the relevant bureaucracy o r indirectly on
political actors who are able to influence bureaucratic activity.'95 If the
actual and potential tort victims are not easily identifiable or are widely
dispersed, poorly organized, a n d politically unsophisticated, bureaucratic
agencies that conform to this model probably will remain immune from
the effect of liability rules.
One might argue that liability rules coupled with constraints on taxation
which preclude passing regulatory costs on to taxpayers (if combined effectively)
would provide the necessary incentive on the part of agencies to develop
and implement accident-reduction policies. T h e use of the tax system to
constrain bureaucracies'g6 suffers from the obvious defect that we cannot
always view government as a grasping Leviathan, and that legitimate
welfare-maximizing and redistributive government objectives may demand specific levels of taxation. Given a range of possible government
models and motives, the blunt instrument of a tax constraint as a solution
to the unconstrained costs of bureaucratic negligence does not appear to
be justified.
A fourth and final limiting factor on the use of tort law as a regulatory
194 This model was described in part 2. It is developed more fully in A. Downs An Economic
Theoq of Democracy (New York: Harper 1gj7),and G. Tullock 'Problems of Majority
Voting' (1959)
67J. of Pol. Econ. 57 1.
195 As I point out later, however, it is quite likely that the ability of superior bureaucrats to
control effectively the activities of line officers is overestimated. A more important
point is that this model posits that the regulatory impact of tort law is a product of
political variables - the imposition of political costs, and the signalling of potential
political responses - and not of economic costs and signals. If that is so, it is equally
plausible that we d o not need economic signals at all, and thus the design of a regulatory
instrument effective against governments should focus on political rather than
economic incentives. I develop the signalling model of government liability in part 5.
196 G. Brennan and J.M. Buchanan 'Towards a T a x Constitution for Leviathan' (1977)8J.
of Pub. Econ. 255.Unlike most analyses of tax policy, Brennan and Buchanan do not
postulate a fixed amount of revenue as being necessary to achieve public policy
objectives. They suggest that the government be limited to taxing the more elastic tax
bases, that certain inelastic tax bases be sheltered from taxation entirely, and that taxes
be imposed on all persons equally to limit the government's ability to discriminate and
thus expand its revenue. As Mueller puts it, '"horizontal equity" would be favoured ...
because it limits the government's degrees of freedom, and not for any other ethical
reasons': supra note 23, 169.
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instrument is the inability of large bureaucracies to respond to liability
rules even if some individual bureaucrats are motivated to do so.
Although economic costs generated by liability rules are relevant to
superior bureaucrats whose budgets are constrained and who are
motivated to minimize social costs, those superior bureaucrats will also
respond to internal political risks. Those risks may manifest themselves in
reorganization costs or bureaucratic hostility to change, both of which
may present substantial countervailing incentives, resulting in a failure to
respond to liability risks imposed by an exogenous review institution.lg7
The inability of agencies to respond to legal liability rules is exacerbated
by an asymmetry between the incentives faced by low-level bureaucrats
and those faced by senior bureaucrats who are confronted with liability
claims. For example, a municipal police department that is confronted by
internal disciplinary measures in response to legal liability may respond
by organizing and working to rule or engaging in work stoppages.'g8 A
study of the Detroit police force, which documented 'unprecedented'
damage payments, concluded that obtaining co-operation from police
officers was extraordinarily difficult in view of the interests of the police
officers in continuing their current practices.lg9 Paradoxically, superior
bureaucrats are likely to respond to internally generated costs associated
' ~ the
~ expected internally
with their attempts at program m o d i f i c a t i ~ n . If
generated costs exceed the expected tort costs, the downward signal
generated by tort claims will be significantly d i ~ t o r t e d . The
~ ~ ' process of
regulating bureaucracies is expensive, time-consuming, uncertain, and
potentially embarrassing. Moreover, it may significantly affect depart197 For example, in Connecticut the existence of section 1983 damage actions apparently
did not affect police department practices, partly because the attitude at superior
departmental levels was typically one of complete support for line officers, and partly
because of the political dependence of municipal officials on police agencies. See 'Suing
the Police in Federal Court' supra note 42, 813, 814.
In Owen v. City of Independence 445 U.S. 662 (1980) and Payton v. United States 636 F . nd
I 32 (1981)the court expressed the view that the potential threat of government liability
was of limited relevance to officials, particularly when they perceived their department
as strongly supporting their actions.
198 Schuck, supra note 57, 139
199 Littlejohn, supra note I 7, 409-10
200 Schuck admits this when he refers to the difficult senior bureaucrats experience in
trying to influence the street-level bureaucrats' behatiour, given the 'intense spirit,
loyalty and respect' engendered among government employees working in street-level
departments: Schuck, supra note 57, 106.
2 0 1 Furthermore, the idea that information is distorted as it moves up through bureaucratic organization applies with equal force to information moving down. In addition, the
internal bureaucratic costs will, by definition, be borne by the agency and superior
bureaucrats, while the economic costs of damage awards are likely to be charged to
consolidated revenue funds. See the text accompanying notes 167-1 72 supra.
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mental morale and produce additional conflict with co-workers, unions,
program beneficiaries, and politicians.'"'
v

Possible solutions

If one accepts that only the net margznal benefits of liability rules count, it
may be possible to design liability rules that take into account the ability of
governments to pass on tort costs and to respond effectively to liability
risks. It may be argued that there are some general distinctions, which,
while imperfect, can be relatively easily applied, and which might
generate optimal liability rules in a limited subset of cases. For example,
liability rules might recognize that government is not a monolith, and that
it is itself structured through departments, Crown corporations, independent administrative agencies, program units, units with geographical o r
geopolitical responsibilities, public hospitals, and so on. With that in
mind, one might assume that some of these sub-units will attempt to
maximize profits, and thus should operate subject to liability rules
analogous to those applicable to private economic actors. That is, it is
superficially attractive to propose that liability rules should be used as a
loss-internalizing instrument for a limited subset of 'efficient' state
actors.'O3
This proposal assumes that state institutions may be 'efficient' in two
very different senses. In part 11 I argued that 'efficient' bureaucratic
decisions represent choices motivated by an interest in maximizing social
welfare, and, to the extent that they achieve that objective, it is not
appropriate o r feasible to subject them to liability rules. At the same time,
in a limited set of cases, it can be assumed that the state will be motivated to
maximize its own private welfare, and to the extent that it achieves that
objective it will be 'efficient.""4
An example of this second category of state actor, for which liability
rules might be appropriate, is a state enterprise that is engaged in
delivering goods and services through a market vehicle, that is relatively
independent of central bureaucracies, and that has adopted a corporate
model of economic organization traditionally employed by private
economic actors. Here it might be assumed that the state is seeking to
maximize its private welfare to some degree. In this case, as in the case of
Mashaw, supra note 59, 23
203 This argument is applicable both to a limited subset of bureaucracies that are in fact
efficient and to a related subset o f bureaucracies that are merely motivated by
efficiency criteria but fail to achieve either superior or optimal outcomes.
204 While it may be legitimate to assume that both models o f state action are currently
reflected in bureaucratic 'practices and organization, it may also be impossible to
distinguish one from the other, and in some instances, bureaucratic action will reflect
mixed motivations.
202
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private firms, tort law may appear attractive to ensure that the state
enterprise responds to the social costs of its activities.'O5 In other words, in
designing optimal liability rules we might try to distinguish between state
actors that are motivated by social welfare-maximizing objectives (and are
efficient in that sense) and to which a 'no liability' rule should be applied,
and state actors that are motivated by profit-maximizing objects (and are
efficient in that different limited sense) and to which either strict or fault
liability rules should be applied.'06
That idea is embodied in the approach that has been taken by the courts
in treating Crown corporations engaged in 'non-governmental' activities
as private firms, and thus denying them traditional governmental
immunities.'"7 If one can identify state actors motivated by private
wealth-maximization objectives, liability rules designed to internalize
social costs appear superficially attractive.208 If we determine that a
particular loss was associated with actions motivated by private welfare
motives, this proposal requires liability rules that would force the state
enterprise to take into account the social costs of its activities; in this case,
the public enterprise would be indistinguishable from a private firm.
While this approach is frequently advocated by proponents of an
expanded government liability, it presents several intractable problems.
At the very least one would have to determine whether the particular
subject of review was efficient in attempting to achieve socially optimal
outcomesZ0g o r if it was efficient in seeking to maximize its private
-

-

205 See Spitzer, supra note 5, 527.
206 T h e public enterprise acts like a private firm in terms of its treatment of social costs
(that is, it tries to externalize them), but this does not mean that it will respond to liability
rules in the same way private firms can be expected to. If public enterprises are
inefficient relative to private firms whose management is subject to monitoring
through capital markets, there is no reason to think that these agency costs are the
result of the public enterprise's having internalized social costs.
207 Trebilcock and Prichard, supra note 2 5, I 8. T h e cases on this point are voluminous: see
Halifax v. Hal*
Harbour Commission [1g35] SCR 215; Radych v. Manitoba Power
Commission [1g42] 2 DLR 776 (Man. CA);R . v. OLRB exparteOntarioHousingCorp. (1971)
19 DLR (3d) 47 (Ont. HC);MacLean v. Liquor Licence Board of Ontario (1975) 61 DLR (3d)
237 (Ont. HC);and Bodrugv. Manitoba Housing and Renewal Corp. etal. (1977) 79 DLR (3d)
409 (Man. QB).See also C.H. McNairn 'The Ontario Crown Agency Act' (1973)6 Ottawa
LR I and Peter Hogg The Liability of the Crown in Australia, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom (Melbourne: Law Book Co. 197 I ) 203-8,~12.
Of course, if these public firms are integrated into government activities, the courts
may treat them as government and immunize them from tort liability: Baccus SRL v.
Swvicio Nacional del Trigo [ I9563 3 All ER 7 I 5 (CA) Swiss Israel TradeBank v. Government of
Salta [1g72] I Lloyd's Rep. 497, at 507 (QB) (separate legal entity carrying on
commercial activities not an organ of government).
208 See J.L. Sax 'Takings and the Police Power' (1964) 74 Yale LJ 36, at 63-7.
209 As I argued earlier, if we concluded that the agency was motivated to maximize social
welfare we then would determine the extent to which the socially optimal result was
achieved. T o the extent that it was not achieved, liability rules would be used tocorrect
inefficiencies associated with the decisions.
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welfare."" It is not clear to me that this determination can be made
without incurring substantial costs.
Furthermore, even if we determine that the public enterprise was
motivated to maximize profits, we may want to recognize its 'public'
aspect; and if the public firm is acting in part as a social welfare-maximizer,
we do not want to oblige it to internalize social costs it has already taken
'
if we apply liability rules in this subset of cases,
into a c c o ~ n t .'~Moreover,
we can predict substantial investments by victims in arguing that the
public corporation was acting in a 'business' capacity, and by the
government in demonstrating that the firm was exercising 'governmental' powers."' Formal tests would be inadequate, for government might
legitimately argue that while the enterprise was organized as a public firm
its operations were in fact those of the government, thus making the
implicit argument that the enterprise was acting in a social welfaremaximizing mode."3
We could propose that a public enterprise should always be treated like
a private economic actor, but we must then admit that we may be
allocating losses to the firm that already have been internalized. Moreover, if we establish a formal rule that departments will be immune from
liability while public corporations will be treated like private firms, we
create artificial incentives for the government to choose the former over
the latter as a policy instrument.
An inability to distinguish among a range of bureaucratic models that
may be operating at any given time suggests that a uniform liability rule
applicable to all state enterprises is unlikely to generate optimal incentive
structures. Even if it were possible to distinguish efficient from inefficient
bureaucracies, it would still be necessary to inquire further into the
precise form of efficiency operating in a particular bureaucracy. Further2lo

Furthermore, we must also be sensitive to the reality of a great deal of public enterprise:
it may not conform to either model, but may reflect elements of both.
2 1 1 It is notoriously difficult, however, to disaggregate public from private motives in the
mixed public corporation. See A. Boardman, C. Eckel, M. Linde, and A.R. Vining 'An
Overview of Mixed Enterprises in Canada' Ch. 26 in K.J. Rea and N. Wiseman (eds)
Government and Enterprise in Canada (Toronto: Methuen 1985); A. Tupper and G.
Bruce Doern 'Public Corporations and Public Policy in Canada' Ch. I in A. Tupper and
G.B. Doern (eds) Public Corporations and Public Policy in Canada (Montreal: Institute for
Research on Public Policy 1981); S. Brooks, Who's in Charge? The Mired Ownership
Corporationin Canada (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy 1987)at I 1- 19.
2 I 2 See G.F. Kugler Report of the Attornq General's Task Force on Sovereign Immunity (Trenton,
NJ 1972)at 39,4 1. See also Berardinelli v. Ontario Howing Corporation (1979) go DLR (3d)
48 I , at 493 (SCC)McGonegal v. Gray et al. [1g52] 2 D L R 16I , at 170 (SCC);and Bradford
Corporation v. Myers [ Ig 161 I AC 242.
2 13 This is the type of argument one sees in cases like Mellingerv. NewBrunswickDevelopment
Corporation [1g711 2 All ER 593, at 596 (CA)and Swiss Israel Trade Bank v. Government of
Salta [1g72] Lloyd's Rep. 497 (QB).
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more, there is no reason to assume that all decisions within a particular
bureaucracy are characterized by one form of efficiency or inefficiency in
all situations. In fact, it seems that the administrative costs of drawing the
distinctions at all these levels would make the entire exercise useless. If we
cannot identify this subset of decisions at a reasonable cost, then a
no-liability rule is optimal without additional self-regulatory responses by
the state."4
An alternative solution to the limitations inherent in applying liability
rules to government enterprises engaging in 'non-governmental' functions is to focus the economic signals generated by liability rules on
sub-bureaus within government. In part I I considered only two objects of
government liability - the individual bureaucrat and the government."5
In reality, and as a theoretical proposition, we can focus liability rules on
any of a number of sub-units, and the incentive effects of legal risks are
not identical for all possible units. For example, the extent to which
governments can pass costs on to taxpayers may depend on the level of
government - municipal, provincial, or federal - to which the losses are
shifted by the court. In addition, one can impose liability on intragovernment units, since there is no reason to restrict ourselves to formal legal or
political units; various proposals have been made to allocate liability to a
point somewhere between the individual bureaucrat (exposing her
personal wealth to liability risks) and the government (exposing general
revenues to compensation claims).
If our aim is to signal information about losses associated with state
action, we should design a liability regime that shifts losses to an
intermediate node within government which has managerial, supervisoThis reform
ry, and budgetary authority over the relevant a~tivities."~
would necessitate the recognition of non-corporate intragovernment
units, but this does not seem to create insurmountable problems."7 If
liability were imposed in this fashion, it is likely that the marginal benefits
of liability would be maximized, and that the marginal costs generated by
review errors and the administrative costs would be minimized.
This approach could involve several subsidiary elements, which would
2 14

That is because we would still be faced with the ability of governments to pass costs on to
taxpayers, and we would still have to evaluate the impact o f the political market in
influencing the relevant bureaucracy to internalize losses and the marginal net benefits
o f the liability regime.
2 15 The possibility of imposing liability on superior bureaucrats as well as on line officers
was discussed briefly, but there appears to be no advantage to using that liability
regime. This point is discussed in part I supra.
216 See Mashaw, supra note 5 9 , 3 4 and Schuck, supra note 57, 106.
217 See Northern Pipeline Agency v. Perehinec (1983) I D L R (4th) I (scc) (legal identity
inferred from status-allocating agency powers).
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increase its ability to influence government activity in the appropriate
circumstances. For example, liability would be imposed when political
markets were not working effectively, and on institutions that were not
subject to centralized authority. We might anticipate that state actions
would be directed at maximizing aspects of bureaucratic welfare, given
our assumptions about bureaucratic motives in unregulated contexts. As
well, we could link the liability regime to state activities that were only
tangentially related to bureau objectives and expertisen8 - 'in short,
situations in which agency collection and use of information about
employee negligence is costly o r undervalued."'9 Moreover, if the power
of the sub-unit of government to increase its budget is limited, as it is in the
case of municipal governments, significant loss internalization may take
place.
T h e experience of municipalities suggests that more refined models of
government liability, in which liability is imposed at sub-bureau nodes,
~"~
may in limited circumstances be an attractive regulatory i n s t r ~ m e n t . In
this model the reviewing institution identifies the sub-units within the
bureaucracy that have budgetary, managerial, and supervisory authority
over the bureaucrats whose activities are associated with the injury, and
allocates liability at that point in the bureaucracy. If we are accurate in
identifying that node, and ifwe prevent that bureaufrom shifting losses to other
bureaus or to general revenues, we may effectively force the unit to
internalize social costs. Although the idea is attractive, and is supported by
recent experiences with municipal liability, the proposal has several
shortcomings.
The most important is that bureaucratic budgetary, managerial, and
supervisory authority may be allocated across several levels o r units of
government. In those cases it will be impossible to identify a single node
on which to impose liability. For example, in the case of police torts, the
enforcement responsibilities of the police, the institutional design of
police forces, and managerial authority at the policy and operational
levels cannot be allocated to a single government unit. Under the current
federal tort regime, the federal government is not liable for the tort of
municipal police officers,"' nor is the province."'
Thus, the two
218 In these cases, it is unlikely that redistributivejudgments would be subject to review.
219 Mashaw, supra note 59, 33
2 2 0 This model has been developed by Peter Schuck, supra note 57, 100-46.
2 2 1 Schulze et al. v. The Queen (1974) 47 DLR (3d) I 3 1 , 17 ccc (2d) 24 1 (FCTD)
(municipal
police officers are not automatically agents, servants, or employees of the Federal
Crown under section 3(1) of the Crown Liability Act, RSC 1970, C. c-38).
2 2 2 See Allain v. Procureur General de la Province de Quebec [ I 97 i ] cs 407, at q i I , and Attonley
General for New South Wales v. Perpetual Trurtee Co. Ltd [ i g jj] 1 All ER 846 (PC).
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government institutions which through legislative and regulatory action
significantly define the enforcement responsibilities of municipal police
officers are immune from liability. Moreover, the courts have decided
that municipalities in Canada (which directly or indirectly through police
commissions manage municipal police forces, exercise management
powers of hiring, firing, and disciplining police officers, and fund police
services) are not responsible for the torts of police officers who are
enforcing federal and provincial legislation."3
Given our interest in designing liability rules that will internalize
accident losses; given the differential incentive effects of liability rules
depending on the taxing powers of the governmental unit to which we
direct liability; and given the mixed sources of authority and control over
particular bureaus, identifying a sub-bureau within government is not as
straightforward as one might think. O n e cannot assume that a bureau
with budgetary control also will have supervisory and managerial
authority over the relevant bureaucrats.
The concept of intragovernment liability assumes that the review
mechanism can effectively preclude the shifting of the losses away from
the bureau. T h e separate corporate existence, political status, taxing
powers, and budgetary authority of municipal institutions suggests that in
that limited area of state action the model might operate effectively.
However, in the case of internal government departments, and subbureaus within departments, the model requires the creation of another
bureau to monitor the subject bureau's budgetary allocations in current
and future years to determine whether accident losses are being shifted."4 Only when public institutions are constrained by mechanisms
223 See McLeave v. City of Moncton (1902) 32 SCR 106, 6 ccc 219; Caratozzolo v. Mudock
Ewatrki and City of Edmonton (1982) 47 Alta. LR (2d) 394 (Alta QB);The Queen v. Labour
Relatiow Board et al. (1955) 38 MPR 26 (NB);and Re St Cathannes Police Associaton and
Board of Police Commicsioners [ig71] 15 DLR (3d) 532, I OR 430 (Ont. HC).At the same
time, the municipality may be vicariously liable to victims if the police officers acted as
agents of the city in the execution of municipal by-laws, ordinances, and similar
legislation. The municipality may be directly liable if it appears that it approved or
directed the police activity: City ofMontreal v. Plante (I 923) 34 Que. KB 137; Hebert v. City
of Thetford-Mines [1g32] SCR 424, [ig32] 3 DLR 583. While Ontario and several other
provinces have enacted legislation modifying that presumption (see Police Act, so
1980, c. 381, s. 24; Police Act, RSBC 1979, c. 33 1 , S.54; Provincial Police Act, SM 1971 , c.
85, S. 21; and Police Act, RSS 1978, c. P-15, s. 48), municipal immunity continues in
several provinces. Similar issues arise in the case of provincial police and the RCMP.In
the latter case, the courts have held that federal officers are not employees of the
provincial government. See Re Ombudsman for Saskatchewan [ig74] 46 DLR (3d) 452, at
456-7, 5 WWR 176, at 179-80 (Sask. QB). But see Police Act, RSBC 1979, c. 33 1 , SS.1,
16(2), and 53(1) (provincial government liable for torts of RCMP officers).
224 ASdiscussed above, such internal institutional mechanisms are not operating within the
federal government. See the text accompanying note 172 et seq.
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comparable to those operating in capital markets can we anticipate the
same loss-internalization impact of liability rules as in the case of private
f i r m ~ . ~The
' 5 public review bureau designed to compel the internalization
of social costs will generate its own administrative costs. In view of the
nature of public budgetary allocations, it does not seem possible to
distinguish requests for funds for new programs that will incorporate
funds for accident losses from requests for programs that will not. Finally,
the model assumes that the bureaucrats who will be responding to the
signal are able to influence street-level bureaucrats in such a way as to
reduce accident costs - and that, as we have seen, is not necessarily true.
As well, the benefits of this model of liability must be assessed in the light
of the impact of error costs in determining the relevant node. T o the
extent that errors are made, we will be creating inefficiencies that might
easily offset the gains generated by the liability regime.
Even if we could expect intragovernment units to respond to liability
risks, it is not clear that liability rules are desirable. First, we would have to
determine whether the specific department or public enterprise was
acting in an inefficient manner in respect of the particular activity that is
associated with the loss, or in an efficient manner that mimics the activities
of a private firm.226If the sub-unit is acting inefficiently, we then have to
determine which of the inefficient models best describes the activities that
are relevant to the inquiry. Moreover, attempts to allocate losses to a
particular sub-unit within a bureaucracy may give rise to the externalization of losses associated with interinstitutional actions, which justified
direct government liability in the first place. Even if the distinctions could
be drawn, the administrative costs generated by the rules would be
substantial.
Only if tort losses are allocated to intrabureau units; only if those
intragovernment bureaus are not permitted to pass the costs upwards to
general revenue funds through budgetary appropriations over time; only
if the bureaus do not take into account social costs ex ante; and only if the
225

226

There are two points to be made here. First, the economic independence of many
public enterprises, including Crown corporations, is a question of degree, as is the
economic independence of private firms. T o the extent that private firms can turn to
public resources when they are faced with costs, our ability to influence their behaviour
approximates that of government. Second, it may be that liability rules have a greater
impact on public firms, if those firms react to potential political costs to which private
firms may be less sensitive.
That is, even if wecould identify this intra-bureau node, we should imposeliability only
when we assume that the bureau did not take into account the social costs ex ante. As I
argued earlier, that assumption cannot be true in all cases, and in any event the
alternative political accountability mechanisms will force internalization to some
degree.
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administrative costs associated with lost internalization are minimal will
liability rules be an effective technique to internalize losses.
The current budgetary allocation process does not force departments
to internalize tort costs, and I doubt whether it is possible to design a n
efficient budgetary process that would achieve this outcome. Even i f it
were, the accountability mechanism consisting of budgetaly and fiscal review would
not need to be triggered by the economic signal of tort claims. T h e description of
the current budgetary mechanisms within government confirms the
proposition that the economic environment of the state will effectively
insulate it from liability rules unless it chooses to be bound by them. It may
be that in limited circumstances it ought to do so, but incentives imposed
by exogenous institutions d o not appear to be a necessary o r viable
regulatory technique. At best, tort claims might be a useful signal of
breakdowns in other accountability mechanisms, but one must question
whether other, more effective, signalling devices might be designed
instead.
Conclusion

One purpose of tort law is to reduce the cost of accidents. In this paper I
have explored the possible implications of using tort law to minimize the
number and severity of accidents associated with activities of the federal
government. T h e problem one faces in designing a regulatory instrument
intended to influence government activity is to create an institution that
permits interests of the constituency of 'potential and actual victims of
state action' to be reflected (internalized) in public policy analysis and
decision-making. My analysis suggests that tort law does not seem to be
the instrument one would choose to achieve that end. Yet one advantage
of tort law is that the victims of state action have a direct economic
incentive to signal the harm which the government's activities have
imposed or will impose on them. If we eliminate economic compensation
from the regulatory instrument we must incorporate alternative incentives for victims to inform the relevant alternative regulatory actors of
their losses. Potential victims can be expected to signal government if they
perceive that the expected gains from signalling their potential losses (the
gains associated with modification of the relevant program) exceed the
costs of signalling. Actual victims will signal to the extent that we provide
private incentives for them to d o so. Again, the private incentive does not
have to be related to their losses. Rather, we should set the amount of
'recovery' so that the expected gain on signalling just exceeds the
signalling costs.
Since tort law is inappropriate as a vehicle to achieve that end, we
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should consider alternative institutions that might be more successful.
One candidate is a review institution that is independent of the government unit subject to the complaint, and that has the information, political
power, and budgetary and managerial authority to respond to the
economic signal which the liability rule represents."' Assuming that the
review institution within the government is motivated by social welfaremaximizing objects, this institution could act as a focus for individual
complainants to disclose their losses. T h e institution could then function
simply as a conduit for the information about the losses associated with
state action, which is all that is necessary if o u r assumption about motives
is correct. This regulatory instrument could include the use of publicity by
the review institution, which would permit alternative systems of political
accountability to operate more e f f e ~ t i v e l ~ . " ~
T h e conclusion we can draw from this analysis is that tort law, as it is
presently conceived, is a poorly designed instrument to achieve regulatory objectives in the case of state action. Tort law operates as an effective
behaviour-modification technique only in so far as it uses economic costs
to signal the government that its activities are associated with private
losses. T o influence state action we must couple the signal with budgetary
and legislative constraints. These constraints are expensive and are prone
to their own error costs. More important, to the extent that the constraints
are operating effectively the need for economic signals is questionable.
We might better direct our efforts towards designing effective 'political'
markets instead of attempting to use economic signals to influence state
and bureaucratic action.

T h e institution could be associated with an information-gathering function.
228 See Fox 'Corporate Sanctions: Scope for a New Selectivisrn' (1982) Mersey LR 26, and B.
Fiss and J. Braithwaite The Impact of Publicity on Corporate Offenders (Albany: State
University of New York Press 1983)
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